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Imagining a Right to Housing, Lying in the
Interstices
Shelby D. Green*
"[T]he majestic quality of the law ... prohibits the wealthy as well as the poor
from sleeping under the bridges, from begging in the streets, and from stealing
bread. I
I. INTRODUCTION
In this quotation is the notion that the law affords the same legal protections to
all persons in making their life choices, regardless of their station in life. Also
implicit in this quotation is the notion that the poor possess the autonomy to make
choices-that they may choose to sleep under bridges instead of in conventional
housing.2 The latter suggestion is an uncomfortable one and prompts the question
whether the state has some obligation to facilitate the making of those life
choices, particularly with respect to a place to live. In the last two decades, the
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. J.D.. Georgetown University Law
Center, B.S. Towson State University. @ 2012, Shelby D. Green.
1. ANATOLE FRANCE, LE Lys ROUGE 87 (1905).
2. France's cynical comment on the seeming indifference of the law as to those lacking economic
resources has proved enlightening in a number of other contexts. See e.g., Joy Gordon, The Concept of
Human Rights: The History and Meaning of its Politicization, 23 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 689, 723-724
(1998) (citing Anatole France and explaining that "Under the dominant conception, political equality is
purely formal; the fact that all citizens of a certain age have the right to hold public office does not mean
that substantively they have the means to do so. Political equality-the formal equality of all citizens in
relation to government and to law-does not entail economic equality-substantively having the means
to exercise one's political right."); Cheryl I. Harris, Symposium, The Constitution Of Equal Citizenship
For A Good Society: Equal Treatment And The Reproduction Of Inequality, 69 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1753,
1756 n.7 (2001) (speaking on how equal protection can be violated and stating that "So it was with the
majestic equality of French law, which Anatole France described as forbidding rich and poor alike to
sleep under the bridges of Paris ... . As the Supreme Court observed in Jenness v. Fortson, 'sometimes
the greatest discrimination can lie in treating things that are different as though they were exactly alike"'
(quoting LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1438-39 (2d ed., 1988) (citation omitted));
Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. L.J. 1499, 1499 n.2
(1991) (citing Anatole France and suggesting that "When the Court ignores the differences between
people in poverty and those not in poverty, the result can be especially pernicious rhetoric.").
3. See Sheila Crowley, The Affordable Housing Crisis: Residential Mobility of Poor Families and
School Mobility of Poor Children, 72 J. NEGRO EDUC. 22, 23 (2003) (describing in stark terms the
detrimental effects of unaffordable or inadequate housing, including having less funds available for other
necessities, including food and medical care, and having to move in with other family or friends in small
spaces).
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lack of affordable housing has reached worrisome proportions.4 As housing
becomes less affordable, it becomes less available.5 Households with the lowest
incomes feel this crisis most acutely.6
If housing were regarded as a fundamental right, should it impose burdens
upon the state, not only to refrain from interfering with access and retention, but
also to ensure that housing is available and affordable? Housing would be
regarded as a fundamental right if it were to be considered an inextricable
component of liberty. Then, it would also be a political right as guaranteed by our
Constitution. Nowhere in constitutional documents is such a right expressed. The
Bill of Rights speaks of, and the courts have upheld, rights in property, liberty,
and due process, but have been largely silent about housing. Although clearly
suggestive, this silence alone should not be taken as conclusive that no such right
to housing exists; for other rights, also not expressed, have been found to be
fundamental and are protected, including the right to privacy,' travel,8 and
counsel in criminal proceedings.9 These rights have been found in the interstices
of the Constitution.
Although property and housing are largely synonymous concepts, control and
security of possession of a private sphere are necessary predicates for housing,
but ownership per se is not. Property has long been viewed as exclusionary, with
4. See OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., AFFORDABLE
HOUSING NEEDS 2005: REPORT TO CONGRESS 4 (2007), available at http://www.huduser.org/portall
publicationslaffhsg/wcHsgNeeds07.html (reporting that millions of households are in need of adequate
and affordable housing: "In 2005, there were only 77 units affordable and available for rent for every 100
very low-income renter households . . .. For extremely low-income renter households, the ratio was
worse: 40 units per 100 households, down from 43:100 in 2003").
5. See id. at 36-37.
6. JoINT CTR. FOR Hous. STUD. OF HARVARD UNIV., AMERICA'S RENTAL HOUSING: MEETING CHAL-
LENGES, BUILDING ON OPPORTUNITIES 6-7 (2011), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/
jchs.harvard.edu/files/americasrentalhousing-2011-0.pdf (noting that fifteen percent, or 14.9 million
households, in the United States considered extremely low income, with a median household income of
$7000 a year, spent an average of fifty-four percent of their income on housing, much higher than the
thirty percent believed to be optimal); see also Crowley, supra note 3, at 26. As affordable housing has
shrunk due to a myriad of causes, including gentrification, conversion, demolition and abandonment,
low-income households must compete with those that are more well-to-do. In its 2005 report to Congress
on affordable housing needs in the nation, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
reported that there were 5.99 million households with worst case housing needs, a statistically significant
increase of 817,000 households (sixteen percent) from 5.18 million in 2003. Households with "worst case
needs" are defined as unassisted renters with very low incomes who have one of two "priority
problems"-either households shouldering a "severe rent burden" in paying more than half of their
income for housing, or living in severely substandard housing. These represent five-and-a-half percent of
all American households. In 2011, HUD reported a dramatic increase in the "worst case needs" group
when the number of renters in this category rose twenty percent from 5.91 to 7.10 million from 2007 to
2009. While all types of households were affected by the increase, families with children represented the
greatest proportion, roughly thirty-nine percent. OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF
Hous. & URBAN DEV., WORST CASE HOUSING NEEDS 2009: REPORT To CONGRESS VII, 1-2, 3, 5 (2011),
available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/worstcaseHsgNeeds09.pdf.
7. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
8. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
9. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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Imagining a Right to Housing
the state backing the owner's right to keep out the world. The interest in housing
is currently protected under narrow principles that preclude discriminatory
barriers to access, put up by individuals or by governments as they administer
housing programs and adopt land use measures, and that require judicial process
before an eviction from rental property.'o Admittedly, a broader right to housing
might impose a burden upon the state" to facilitate its enjoyment in a way
different than the state fulfills the right to travel, which, as currently recognized,
does not require the government to provide mass transit or a private automobile
to all citizens, but only to refrain from and remove state-imposed obstacles to the
freedom of movement.12 Instead, in fulfilling an obligation to effectuate a right to
housing, a state may be required to appropriate government funds to needy
families for the purchase or rental of property for housing, but the practical
infrastructure for this new burden is already in place. Federal and state programs
already exist offering funding for housing construction, providing that some
amount of newly constructed housing be affordable and ensuring that tenants
have affordable rent and security of tenure.' 3 Importantly, a right to housing
would require a shift in the prevailing presumptions that are used in evaluating
local land use measures and development decisions that have the effect of making
housing less available.14 It would provide a platform for the initiation of
measures to ensure housing, establishing a presumption of legality. It would shift
the starting point on housing initiatives from whether to undertake measures at all
toward issues of the design and implementation of plans for housing.
While the issue of housing, from a deontological perspective, seems easy, the
analysis here must also treat the political concerns because our society, though
10. Compare Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 456 (1982) (depriving tenant of leasehold without
notice violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution) and
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 387 (1969) (ordinance providing that regulations of real estate on the
basis of race required approval by referendum), with S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount
Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 719 (N.J. 1975) (zoning ordinance strictly limiting the amount of multi-unit
dwellings allowed in the community); see also infra notes 247-301 and accompanying text.
11. By "state," I mean government and society in general.
12. See infra notes 110-120 and accompanying text.
13. See generally NESTOR M. DAVIDSON & ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (2009); Peter Salsich, Toward a Policy of Heterogeneity: Overcoming A
Long History ofSocioeconomic Segregation in Housing, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 459 (2007) (discussing
various government programs for affordable housing); Adam Zeidel, Affordable Housing: The Case for
Demand-Side Subsidies in Superstar Cities, 42 URB. LAW. 135 (2010) (discussing the mix of affordable
housing programs in New York City and the importance of demand-side subsidies in stimulating the
housing market and revitalizing neighborhoods). The history of public housing programs is discussed
infra notes 176-199 and accompanying text.
14. Proposals to develop affordable housing are often saddled with the burden of demonstrating that
they do not adversely affect the public welfare, by causing increased density, reduction of property
values, and even introduction of anti-social elements by poor and ethnic minorities. Zoning ordinances
often work in tandem with these expressed concerns to preclude the introduction of such housing in these
communities. See, e.g., City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188 (2003);
Reinhart v. Lincoln Cnty., 482 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 2007). These issues are discussed more fully infra
notes 247-301 and accompanying text.
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The Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law & Policy
founded in part upon abstract principles of justice and morality, is a political
system governed by the positive laws and principles set out in the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights. If such right is deemed to be fundamental, this
characterization would result in greater deference for the right-holder and greater
burdens upon those who would interfere. Fundamental rights have been defined
by the Court as those that bear some "resemblance to the fundamental interests
that previously have been viewed as implicitly protected by the Constitution." 5
Recently, the process of finding that a right is fundamental was described by
Justice Scalia as "mysterious."' 6 I maintain that a right to housing can be found
within our existing political structure. The analysis proceeds as follows: I start by
recognizing that the right to acquire and hold property without undue interference
is unquestioned in our political system. Then I consider that barriers to the
enjoyment of this right come in many forms: exclusionary zoning by municipali-
ties; government-supported development projects involving takings of property
and tax subsidies; racial discrimination; and the socio-economic status of those
seeking housing. From this, I consider that housing-a private sphere that
enables individual flourishing-is a prerequisite for humanity and hence liberty. I
reason that enjoyment of this liberty interest, therefore should impose some
obligation on the part of the state to provide, or at least act, affirmatively to
facilitate the availability of affordable housing.
As I set out to explore this proposition, I quickly encountered a seemingly
insurmountable roadblock. The Supreme Court's ruling in Lindsey v. Normet, 7
where in a challenge to Oregon's forcible entry and detainer statute that subjected
tenants to immediate eviction upon non-payment of rent even if they had a claim
against the landlord arising out of the landlord's failure to maintain the premises,
the Court stated that the Constitution "has not federalized the substantive law of
landlord-tenant relations."18 Thus, while the right to acquire and hold property
was seen as firmly established as a negative fundamental right in favor of the
fee-holder landlord, the tenant's limited interest in preserving his housing would
not be protected as a positive right. 9 But, the apparent bar from this case to a
15. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 229-30 (1985) (finding no fundamental
property interest in continued enrollment in medical school); see also a further discussion of rights infra
notes 121-33 and accompanying text.
16. Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 256 (2008). A further discussion of Gonzalez appears
infra notes 81-98 and accompanying text.
17. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
18. Id. at 68.
19. A debate on the existence of a constitutional right to housing occurred between Professors Akil
Amar, Curtis Berger, and Robert Ellickson. See Akil Amar, Forty Acres anda Mule: A Republican Theory
ofMinimal Entitlements, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POt'Y 37 (1990); Curtis Berger, Beyond Homelessness: An
Entitlement to Housing, U. MIAMI L. REv. 315 (1990-199 1); Robert Ellickson, The Untenable Casefor an
Unconditional Right to Shelter, 15 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POt'Y 17 (1992). However, there may be a few
additional points to urge. It seems that the overarching issue being raised by this dialogue is the question
of justice as it pertains to the allotment of goods, opportunities, and rewards. John Rawls proposed a
theory for treating people according to their (a) desert or merit, (b) needs or abilities, or both or (c) human
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Imagining a Right to Housing
"right to housing," if read narrowly, may not preclude finding such a right. 2 0
Instead, it is just that-apparent and not real.
This Article explores whether the philosophical and constitutional predicates
for the recognition of a right to housing exist in some form in our nation's
jurisprudence and political order. Part II traces the evolution of the concept of
"rights" from that embraced by the country's founders to the present, how such
a right to housing would fit within the dialogue of property rights, the notion
of ownership, and the interest in liberty. Part III discusses the historical role
of the court in protecting housing. Part IV discusses the notion of protecting
rights to housing under existing equal protection and due process principles.
Part V contains a discussion of the heightened scrutiny state courts are applying
to land use regulations that affect the availability of housing. Part VI discusses
new predicates for an affirmative right to housing. Conclusions are offered in
Part VII.
II. EVOLUTION OF RIGHTS: FROM NATURAL LAW TO POLITICS AND SOCIAL ORDER
In eighteenth century political thought, rights were founded in reason. 2 1
The idea was that "the world and its relation to human society [was] a single
intelligible structure," capable of comprehension through the application of
reason. 2 2 The concept of human autonomy emerged, which presupposed a belief
in self-regulation, development, and direction.2 3 We were no longer bound to a
world driven by the exorable movements of the natural world, but now humans
could transform their world from one of basic self-preservation to a rational form
of conscious planning. Autonomy became the premise for emergent theories of
society that presupposed basic needs and legal entitlements.24 It became the duty
of government to promote and refrain from interfering with "the integrity of
worth and well-being. Under this theory, "[a]ll social values-liberty and opportunity, income and
wealth, and the bases of self-respect-are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any,
or all, of these values is to everyone's advantage." JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 8-22, 61-65 (1971).
Injustice involves inequalities, which are not to the benefit of all, such that redistributions to achieve
equality may be required. Id. This Article focuses more precisely on the liberty interest captured by the
notion ofjustice.
20. How the Court construed the property interest in Lindsey v. Normet, not fully recognizing the
tenants' property interest in their tenancies, and the right to a habitable dwelling, will be discussed infra
notes 145-59 and accompanying text.
21. J.M. KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY 58, 267 (1992). The Founders of our
country embraced the ideas of the European Enlightenment. For a thoughtful discussion of this point, see
Peter Gay, America the Paradoxical, 62 VA. L. REV. 843, 846 (1976) ("The reliance of the Founding
Fathers on European political theory was as pervasive as it is obvious .. .. The Federalist, the most
mature and most American statement of the political ideals and political techniques of the Founders, is
incomprehensible without a full appreciation of its European sources.").
22. Dieter Henrich & David S. Pacini, The Contexts of Autonomy: Some Presuppositions of the
Comprehensibility offHuman Rights, 112 DAEDALUS 255, 261 (1983).
23. E.J. HOBSBAWN, THE AGE OF REVOLUTION: 1789-1848, at 278 (1962).
24. Henrich & Pacini, supra note 22, at 262.
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self-determination in human creative action." 2 5 This also meant that "[w]hether
guaranteeing a sphere of freedom in which the [person] can act, or assuring the
minimal conditions under which the [person] might live, the notion of rights
became inseparable from the conditions of the factual world." 26 Although, "in
some sense, any normative principle differs from the factual world insofar as it is
an ideal for, rather than a reflection of, the ordering of the world." 27
At the time of the Declaration of Independence, this duty to enable
self-determination was not interpreted to mean a duty to ensure some ownership
of property to all citizens, even if unequal.2 8 Instead, the aim was to protect from
governmental interference those inalienable rights, identified as "life, liberty and
the pursuit of happiness." 29 These rights were interpreted to mean not only
protection against physical assault, but also the recognition and identification of a
certain personal sphere of autonomy necessary for self-realization and self-
fulfillment.3 0 However, the failure to attempt to spread property ownership
seemed inconsistent with the highly influential labor theory of property, famously
described and explained by John Locke.3 '
Thomas Jefferson's political philosophy was greatly influenced by Locke.
Jefferson believed that ownership of land by individuals was a necessary
ingredient toward freedom, independence, and sustaining a republican form of
32
government. He believed that independent labor could enable a man to "divest
himself of subordination to superiors and cultivate that inner strength upon which
republicanism depended." 33 That "virtue and judgment produced by such
independent labor .. . rendered [men] capable of becoming republicans, and
therefore rendered America capable of republican government."3 4 Jefferson
embraced the Lockean idea that, with the great abundance of land in America,
each man was entitled to a share.3 Jefferson's vision of the republic was one in
which there was a wide distribution of land and individuals, secure in their own
25. Id.
26. Id. at 258.
27. Id.
28. JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 5, 70-73
(1988).
29. See Steven J. Eagle, The Development of Property Rights in America and the Property Rights
Movement, 1 GEo. J.L. & PUB. Pot'Y 77, 82 (2002).
30. Carl J. Friedrich, Rights, Liberties, Freedoms: A Reappraisal, 57 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 841, 841
(1963).
31. Locke believed that God gave to all men the natural resources on the earth in common. When an
individual applies his labor and skill to the natural bounty, "he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it
something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property." JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF
GOVERNMENT, paras. 26-32 (1690).
32. Stanley N. Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionary America, 19 J.L. &
ECON. 467,474-76, 479-88 (1976).
33. Id. at 474.
34. Id. at 475.
35. LOCKE, supra note 31, at para. 37; see also Katz, supra note 32, at 475.
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Imagining a Right to Housing
commitment to the idea of public good. To that end, "political representatives
would act in an entirely disinterested spirit." 36
But the political realities were different. Though political virtue was at the core
of republican political thought, the depression of the 1780s and the seeming
ineffectiveness of the government under the Articles of Confederation seemed
too frustrating to encourage republican spirit. 37 The prevailing idea then became
that government should exist to protect property, given that the great majority of
Americans would not be landed or possessed of property. 38 The Constitution of
1787 omitted guarantees of equality of land ownership, or at least minimal
possession, as a basis of republicanism. The emerging federalists bowed to the
human instinct for self-regard above all. Indeed, "the primacy of the private
passions for individual self-preservation; self-enrichment and self-aggrandize-
ment" were raised in their influences on human behavior.39 The dilemma then
for the Founders was how to protect the small propertied class from oppression
by those who were landless. 4 0 All recognized that "[p]roperty was important for
the exercise of liberty, and liberty required the free exercise of property rights;
this free exercise would inevitably lead in turn to an unequal distribution of
property."4 1 The Founders rightly perceived the connection between property
and other basic human goods, especially liberty and security. Yet, perhaps
perversely, this belief in the essentiality of property to liberty led the Founders (as
can be discerned from the Federalist papers) to act to affirm and entrench
landholdings of the haves and to ignore the plight of the have-nots.42 The
Founders framed the concern as one involving fear of oppression by the many
against the few, not about the effects of unequal distribution of property per se.43
Yet, the Bill of Rights aimed to protect citizens in general against a tyrannical
government, not a propertied minority against a demanding majority." John
Adams believed that:
[P]ower always follows property .... [T]he balance of power in a society []
accompanies the balance of property in land. The only possible way, then of
36. Katz, supra note 32, at 473, 482-83.
37. Id. at481.
38. Jennifer Nedelsky, American Constitutionalism and the Paradox of Private Property, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE 241, 252 n. 19
(Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988); Katz, supra note 32, at 481.
39. "[S]elfish passions were assumed to be fundamental to human nature. [S]elf-interest of the
individual was made a yardstick of the public good. [Plrivate passions [would .. .] work to the advantage
of the body politic." Katz, supra note 32, at 486.
40. Katz, supra note 32; see also Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries, and the Bounded Self, in
LAW AND THE ORDER OF CULTURE 162 (Robert Post ed., 1991).
41. Nedelsky, supra note 40, at 164.
42. Id. at 163-69.
43. Id.
44. See generally THE BILL OF RIGIrrs: GOVERNMENT PROSCRIBED (Ronald Hoffman & Peter J. Albert
eds., 1997).
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preserving the balance of power on the side of equal liberty and public virtue, is
to make the acquisition of land easy to every member of society, to make a
division of land into small quantities, so that the multitude may be possessed of
landed estates. If the multitude is possessed of the balance of real estate,
the multitude will have the balance of power and in that case the multitude will
take care of the liberty, virtue and interest of the multitude, in all acts of
government.45
Still, no provisions for redistribution or equalizing property ownership46 made
their way into the Constitution or the Bill of Rights. Indeed, at the Philadelphia
Convention, Alexander Hamilton stated: "It was certainly true that nothing like
an equality of property existed: that an inequality would exist as long as liberty
existed, and that it would unavoidably result from that very liberty itself."4 7
Professor Jennifer Nedelsky points out that the Founders were aware of this
tension, but that they were preoccupied with "insulating property from demo-
cratic decision making." 4 8 "Rights became things to be protected, not values to be
collectively determined" and they addressed the widespread fear about threats to
property by setting up a "system of institutions that would minimize the threat of
the future property-less majority in large part by minimizing their political
efficacy."4 9 The result was an articulation of two categories of rights: civil rights,
having property at its center, whose protection was the true aim of government,
and political rights, such as the right to participate in government.o While the
Constitution contained few formal declarations of rights as would serve as limits
on federal government power, the Founders attempted to protect civil rights "in
more subtle ways by channeling the power of the people in order to minimize
their threat to property and civil rights generally." 5' But as will be developed later
in this Article, the expressed interest in "liberty" has been the predicate for the
45. Adams, however, was doubtful that non-propertied persons possessed the good judgment and
reason to be allowed to vote and thought that it was not a wise proposition that "every man who has not a
farthing ... to have an equal voice with any other in acts of state." JOHN ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN
ADAMS 376-77 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1969) (1856).
46. In 1798, there was gross inequality in wealth and land ownership. See Lee Soltow, The
Distribution of Income in the United States in 1798: Estimates Based on the Federal Housing Inventory,
69 REv. EcON. & STAT. 181, 181-82 (1987) (finding severe income disparities from an analysis of housing
properties in 1798, the most valuable house being valued at more than $30,000, but the average being
$262).
47. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 424 (1787). James Madison seemed to
echo Alexander Hamilton's sentiment when he stated that the "diversity in the faculties of men, from
which the rights of property originate, [was] not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests";
that it was the "first object of government" to protect these faculties; and that "the protection of different
and unequal faculties of acquiring property" would lead to different kinds and degrees of property, which
would produce "a division of society into different interests and parties." THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James
Madison) (Penn State Electronic Classics Series Publication 2001).
48. Nedelsky, supra note 40, at 166.
49. Id.
50. Id. By this, its seems that Nedelsky means safeguarding the then-unequal distribution of property.
5 1. Id.
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Imagining a Right to Housing
finding of other important constitutional rights. The recognition of the impor-
tance of property to liberty helps make the case for a right to housing.
What did the Founders understand or mean by "property"? "[T]he existence of
a broad understanding of property during the Founding Era has been widely
recognized."5 2 In fact, it has been suggested that the Founders conceptualized
many important interests as rooted in "property" rather than in "liberty." This
textual equality of "liberty" and "property" in the Due Process Clause was not
idle, but suggests the important political notion that property facilitates personal
and political self-determination. Despite the absence of measures to facilitate
ownership, the idea held by the Founders was that "to have liberty, one had to
have property."5 4 Under this conception, property cannot be viewed as a mere
collection of tangible goods and economic rights, but rather as a "broad range of
human rights" that are intimately related to "the development of human
personality."55 In light of the Founders' comprehensive understanding of
property, Professor Laura Underkuffler rightly asks "why .. . the comprehensive
approach [is] often overlooked"56 in favor of an approach seemingly limited to
ensuring that individuals are accorded procedures before property is affected,
rather than protecting the substances of rights for their essence.
Land and its private ownership have been central in the development of our
society and political institutions.58 Indeed, a well-regarded theory of property is
52. Laura S. Underkuffler, On Property: An Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127, 136 (1990).
53. Id. at 137-42. English political philosophers, including John Locke, viewed property as including
important aspects of self. See LOCKE, supra note 30.
54. REID, supra note 28, at 5; see also Carol M. Rose, Property as a Keystone Right, 71 NoTRE DAME
L. REv. 703, 725-30 (1984) (asserting that property interests should be deemed no less important than
liberty rights).
55. REID, supra note 28, at 138, 140; see also John 0. McGinnis, The Once and Future
Property-Based Vision of the First Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 49, 64-71 (1996) (noting the Lockean
nature of Madison's conception of free speech as a kind of property interest).
56. Underkuffler, supra note 52, at 141.
57. Professor Underkuffler believes that the Court became spooked by the Lochner jurisprudence and
enamored by the lure of economics as an explanation for all human behavior. The consequence is the
elimination of important subset of fundamental interests from protection against governmental
abridgment. Id. In Lochner, the Court reached to find substantive due process rights from the text of the
Bill of Rights, such as the right to sell one's labor at whatever price one deems fit. Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (invalidating law limiting hours of work as an unreasonable interference with the
liberty of contract protected by the 14th Amendment).
58. As suggested earlier, in the years preceding the Revolutionary War, land ownership was hardly
equally distributed "either among the regions or among individuals." Indeed, Jones states: "The South
was the richest and New England the poorest. It took the wealth of two middle colonists, or
two-and-a-half New Englanders, to equal the assets of an average southern free wealthholder." Alice
Hanson Jones, Wealth and Growth of the Thirteen Colonies: Some Implications, 44 J. ECON. Hisr. 239,
250 (1984). Even within the region itself, New England had great wealth disparities, "ranging from the
large wealth of some rich merchants, lawyers, and sea captains to ... small farmers, poor widows, [and]
sailors." Id. at 250-51. This wealth was made up largely of land, which accounted for over half the total
physical wealth in the Thirteen Colonies. Id. In New England, land was followed by livestock, then
"other producers' goods, then by consumer goods, and lastly by slaves. Id. at 251. But in the South, slaves
were second only to land in value." Id.
401No. 3]
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that society developed to protect property in land.5 Innumerable values arise
from land ownership-security, wealth, stature, identity, pride, and control are
but a few. Property in land has long been regarded as necessary for the
development of human aspirations and human flourishing. 60 The laws that arose
to protect property have long-strived to protect these values in one way or
another, although the hierarchy among these has shifted over time and continues
to do so. 6 ' But throughout, the importance of land has remained constant. Every
parcel of land being considered unique, remedies that developed for its protection
have been calculated to offer extraordinary relief-the return of the land.6 2
Property represents "a concrete means of having control over one's life, of
expressing oneself, and of protecting oneself from the powers of others,
individuals or collective." 6 3 In order for property to serve these purposes, the
security of one's relationship to property is essential. The value of property is
realized only when it is protected, that is, backed up by the state.64 In this sense,
as stated in the beginning of this Article, property is about the right to exclude
from the vantage of one with property or with the ability to acquire it. "[T]he
power to exclude that our legal structure of property gives us is the starting point
of all contracting, all negotiation over use of, access to, and exchange of property
and labor."65 The constitutional protection for property can be perceived as
protecting individual autonomy by erecting walls around rights beyond which the
government or other individuals may not intrude. But where one lacks a sphere of
one's own, and is entirely dependent upon the charity of others, one cannot be
said to be autonomous. Like liberty, property facilitates democratic self-
governance both directly and indirectly. It does so directly by dispersing power,
59. See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Oakeshotte ed. 1946). Hobbes ascribed the origins of
society to the need to secure possessions against a superior might. He assigns to the sovereign power "the
whole power of prescribing the rules, whereby every man may know, what goods he may enjoy and what
actions he may do, without being molested by any of his fellow subjects; and that is it [sic] men call
propriety' .... These Rules of propriety, or meum and tuum, and of 'good', 'evill,' 'lawful,' and
'unlawfull' in the actions of subjects, are the Civil Lawee . . ." Ch. 18 at 113.
60. See Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8, 12-14 (1927) (discussing
how property gives power and sovereignty over oneself and others); William H. Taft, The Right of Private
Property, 3 MICH. L.J. 215, 218-19 (1894) (asserting that protection of property was necessary to
encourage man toward gainful activity).
61. In early feudalism, because the whole political regime was premised upon land ownership and the
attendant duties that flowed, tight controls over uses and alienation were needed. J.H. BAKER, AN
INTRODUCTION To ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 193-96 (2005). As those controls gradually loosened and
property became regarded as a commodity, then rules aimed at protecting the market value of land
became more prominent. S.E. Thorne, Tudor Social Transformation and Legal Change, in ESSAYS IN
ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 197, 200-01 (1985).
62. JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON THE SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS § 9 (1879).
63. Nedelsky, supra note 40, at 165.
64. Cohen, supra note 60, at 12.
65. Nedelsky, supra note 40, at 180, citing Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly
Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SC. Q. 470,472-73 (1923).
402 [Vol. XIX
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Imagining a Right to Housing
thereby creating a means of enforcing accountability, 66 and indirectly by
facilitating the exercise of other liberties.67
A. Rights in the Interstices
As stated in the beginning, while ownership and housing are often used
synonymously, ownership is not necessary for housing. This means a right to
housing could exist without disturbance of traditional understandings of owner-
ship. A right to housing would have a different source and different contours. Its
recognition would fit within the general evolution of the recognition of rights
based upon the importance of the interest sought to be protected.
In the eighteenth century, four freedoms animated dialogue on political and
economic theory: 6 8 laissez-passer urged by the export-oriented farmers for
international free trade; laissez-faire, pushed by commercial interests seeking
freedom from governmental interference with the market mechanisms; laissez-
travailler, pressed by the manufacturers and mechanics for occupational
freedom; and laissez-placer, demanded by the financial and monied group for
freedom in order to buy and sell rights to property.69 But these very narrow
freedoms seemed to ignore the needs of the great body of citizens who were not
capitalists. They reflected the narrow conception of the public interest as defined
by economic freedom-that individual self-interest, unfettered, would lead to the
ideal society.70
In 1941, President Roosevelt offered a new conception of freedom in his Four
Freedoms speech.7 ' He spoke of the freedom of speech and expression; the
freedom to worship God in one's own way; the freedom from want; and the
freedom from fear.72 President Roosevelt's conception of rights was quite
divergent from that which inspired the Declaration of Independence in 1776 and
the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, adopted in
1789.73 The latter were grounded in notions of natural law, principally that man
66. See Rose, supra note 54, at 340-45; see also MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 9
(1962).
67. ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 107-08 (1953); Cohen, supra note
60, at 14.
68. E.A. J. Johnson, Federalism, Pluralism, and Public Policy, 22 J. ECON. HIsT. 427, 436 (1962).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 437, 444.
71. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address to Congress (1941), in 87 CONG. REC. 36.
72. Id. The Roosevelt Administration thus embarked upon perhaps the greatest government social
welfare programs in United States history, the New Deal. By 1942, the total government spending as a
share of the economy had risen to fifty-two percent and peaked at nearly seventy percent in 1944, when
unemployment finally fell to one percent. Steve Lohr, Something to Fear After All, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27,
2009, at B 1. Among the prominent programs was the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). The FHA
was created by the National Housing Act of 1934, 12 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006) (original version at ch. 847,
48 Stat. 1246 (1934)).
73. DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN (Great Neck Publishing 2009) (1789).
The Declaration purported to declare "natural, imprescribable, and inalienable rights", which should be
403No. 3]
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was endowed with certain fixed and unalterable rights and reason.74 They were
expressed by Locke as the right to life, liberty, and property and later the pursuit
of happiness.7' These rights largely aimed to serve as a bulwark for the individual
against governmental power that might impact one's physical existence. But,
beginning in the nineteenth century, ideas emerged that questioned the belief that
the specification of rights was fixed and invariable.76 Largely as a consequence of
the changing roles and levels of participation in civil society, the theory of natural
rights gave way to "civil liberties."7 7 New freedoms emerged that embraced both
economic and social interests. They included the freedoms to "social security, to
work, to rest and leisure, to education, to an adequate standard of living, [and] to
participation in cultural life."7 Roosevelt's freedoms from want and fear were
necessary "to liberate [man] from restrictions and inhibitions which hinder his
full development as a human being," and this required that social and political
institutions undertake to ensure that no barriers-either man-made or natural-
stood in the way of the enjoyment of new freedoms.
Beginning in the twentieth century, at least up to a point, the Court was
disposed to moving beyond the literal specification of rights in the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights, toward a recognition of other rights fundamental to a free
and ordered society. Nonetheless, in locating these other fundamental rights, the
first resort for the Court has been the literal text of the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights: right to freedom of expression and religion; right to property; right to
freedom from extreme punishment; right to vote; and right to speedy trial by a
jury of peers. Then, the Court has looked to the interstices, the penumbra, to find
other protections and guarantees.so
Justice Scalia described what he meant about the "mysterious" process of
determining if a right is fundamental in Gonzalez.8' He stated:
respected by the government. The Declaration states, inter alia that "I. Men are born, and always
continue, free and equal in respect of their rights. Civil distinctions, therefore, can only be founded on
public utility; II. The end of all political associations is the preservation of the natural and imprescribable
rights of man; and these rights are Liberty, Property, Security, and Resistance of Oppression .... IV.
Political Liberty consists in the power of doing whatever does not injure another. The exercise of the
natural rights of every man, has no other limits than those which are necessary to secure to every other
man the free exercise of the same rights; and these limits are determinable only by the law."
74. LOCKE, supra note 31, at paras. 5-6.
75. Id. at paras. 4, 6, 11, 23, 27, 45-50, 34-37, 123-24, 131, 168.
76. Friedrich, supra note 30, at 842.
77. Friedrich meant the range of activities of citizens, such as participating in democratic
decision-making, to practice one's religion freely, to academic freedom, the freedom to teach and to learn.
Id.
78. Id. at 843.
79. Id.
80. See discussion of Griswold v. Connecticut and Shapiro, infra notes 101 to 109 and accompanying
text.
81. Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 256 (2008).
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Imagining a Right to Housing
One would think that any right guaranteed by the Constitution would be
fundamental. But I doubt many think that the Sixth Amendment right to
confront witnesses cannot be waived by counsel.82 Perhaps, then, specification
in the Constitution is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for 'fundamen-
tal' status. But if something more is necessary, I cannot imagine what it might
be. Apart from constitutional guarantee, I know of no objective criterion for
ranking rights ... The essence of 'fundamental' rights continues to elude.83
The mysteriousness of this endeavor became quite evident in the Supreme
Court's opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller.84 There, the majority found a
fundamental right in individuals to bear arms under the Second Amendment,
which provides that "[a] well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of
a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed."" The reading of this text by the majority and minority of the court
could not have been more disparate. The majority looked behind the literal text
of the amendment, which on the surface surely guaranteed to afree State the right
to keep a militia and proclaimed that that language protected an individual right
to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia and to use that firearm
for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home.8 The
Court concluded that the prefatory clause in the Amendment ("A well regulated
militia being necessary . . .") announced a purpose but did not limit or expand
the scope of the operative clause ("the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms. . .").8 7 The majority found that the operative clause's text and history
demonstrated that it connoted an individual right to keep and bear arms, and this
88
reading was consistent with the announced purpose of the prefatory clause.
In the dissent's view, this was a strained, if -not dishonest, reading of the
Second Amendment." What is remarkable is that both the majority and the
dissent approached the resolution of the question in the same fashion, beginning
82. Id. (citing Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 444, 452-53 (1912)).
83. Id. at 256-57. The Court concluded that the right to have an Article III judg oversee voir dire is
not a fundamental right, without answering whether it is even a constitutional right and without
explaining what makes a right fundamental in the first place. Justice Scalia pointed out that the Court has
avoided addressing whether the right has a basis in the Constitution. Id. This mysterious process is further
revealed, so to speak, in the subsequent thoughts on the issue by the Court. In Gomez v. United States,
490 U.S. 858 (1989), the Court interpreted the Federal Magistrate Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3), not to
permit a magistrate judge to oversee voir dire, making it unnecessary to consider whether there was a
constitutional right to have an Article III judge oversee voir dire. In Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923,
936-40 (1991), the Court held that judicial overseeing of the voir dire had been waived, which obviated
having to decide whether it was a constitutional right. See also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,
732-33 (1993) (holding that waiver extinguishes the error of not complying with a legal rule).
84. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
85. U.S. CoNsT. amend. II; Heller, 554 U.S. at 648.
86. Heller, 554 U.S. at 632, 636.
87. Id. at 648.
88. Id. at 648-49.
89. Id. at 686.
No. 3] 405
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The Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law & Policy
with the text of the amendment and then examining contemporary evidence
explaining its aims. In the dissent's reading, nothing in the text or the arguments
advanced by proponents of the amendment "evidenced the slightest interest in
limiting any legislature's authority to regulate private civilian uses of firearms."9o
Nothing suggested any intent by the Founders to incorporate a common law right
of self-defense in the Constitution. 9' It seems the majority sought to fill a gap,
reaching a result that made sense in the present day, even if it was not an
important thing at the founding of the republic. At the same time, the dissent
seemed to see good reason for not protecting an individual's right to possess a
firearm as a fundamental right. The point to be made here is that the specification
of rights 9 2 is ongoing and new rights will be identified if the court is convinced of
their contemporary importance. It will then labor, convincingly or not, to ground
that right, either in the literal text of the Constitution or in the interstices.
Implicit in Justice Scalia's opinion in Gonzalez is the idea that not all "rights"
are considered fundamental, in the sense of deserving the greatest constitutional
protection. Some rights are indisputably fundamental, for instance, property and
bodily integrity,93 but whether others will be regarded as such is determined on a
more nuanced basis-the "mysterious" process. The Court has nonetheless
articulated an overarching framework for making this determination, that is,
those interests that bear some "resemblance to the fundamental interests that
previously have been viewed as implicitly protected by the Constitution."9 4
Some of the existing rights related to housing, particularly the right to be free
from discriminatory barriers to access through purchase, have been regarded as
fundamental. This means that the governmental action interfering with these
rights will be struck down, absent a compelling justification9 6 that is narrowly
tailored to express only legitimate state interests. 9 7 Other rights, such as the right
to continuation of a public housing tenancy, have not been deemed fundamental
and, as such, only require reasonable process before any deprivation.9 8
90. Id. at 684.
91. Id.
92. The Court has never explicitly acknowledged any kind of hierarchy of fundamental rights. See
Kenneth Argan, When Government Must Pay: Compensating Rights and the Constitution, 22 CONST.
COMMENTARY 97, 115 (2005).
93. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26, 29-31, 37-39 (1905) (regarding a compulsory
smallpox vaccination).
94. Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 229-30 (1985). See also discussion of rights infra notes
121-33 and accompanying text
95. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441 (1968) (refusal to sell on the basis of race);
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (restrictive covenants against sale on the basis of race). These
cases are discussed at text accompanying notes 202-33.
96. Moore v. City of Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,499-500 (1977).
97. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
98. See LRL Properties v. Portage Metro Hous. Auth., 55 F.3d 1097, 1110-11 (6th Cir. 1995) (rejecting
claim that right to participate in federal housing program is fundamental property interest); Greene v.
Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 451 (1982) ("In determining the constitutionality of a procedure established by
the State to provide notice in a particular class of cases, 'its effect must be judged in the light of its
406 [Vol. XIX
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Imagining a Right to Housing
So too has the meaning of "liberty" proved to be an elastic, amorphous
concept. The Supreme Court stated in Bolling v. Sharpe:99
Although the Court has not assumed to define 'liberty' with any great precision,
that term is not confined to mere freedom from bodily restraint. Liberty under
law extends to the full range of conduct, which the individual is free to pursue,
and it cannot be restricted except for a proper governmental objective.'0o
The fulfillment of the right to liberty therefore has required the recognition of
other rights not specifically set out in the text of the Constitution or the Bill of
Rights, such as the right to privacy and to travel. These cases suggest opposed
points: that the Founders were not as prescient as often thought, or that perhaps
they were, by using terms that could be interpreted to apply to the realities of a
world being shaped by reason and determined by human election. The Court has
come to recognize that as the range of human activities and concerns have grown,
so must the concept of liberty grow. One of the most significant cases embracing
this view was Griswold v. Connecticut.'' There, the Court discerned a private
sphere around individuals beyond which governments were not free to venture.
The Court was asked to decide the constitutionality of a law that criminalized
the use of contraceptive devices and the aiding, abetting, and counseling toward
that end. The challenge was made by a physician who had provided such advice
to a married couple. Admitting that no specific provision of the Constitution
protects the right of a married couple to make such intimate choices about
procreation, the Court nevertheless found that "specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help
give them life and substance," 0 2 and that various guarantees created zones of
privacy. 0 3 The right to privacy here was extracted from several fundamental
constitutional guarantees (the Fourth Amendment protection against unreason-
able searches and seizures; the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination;
practical application to the affairs of men as they are ordinarily conducted."'); see also San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J. dissenting) (urging a "reasoned
approach" to equal protection analysis in which "concentration is placed upon the character of the
classification in question, the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the
governmental benefits they do not receive, and the asserted state interests in support of the
classification").
99. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
100. In that case, segregation in public education was found to be not reasonably related to any proper
governmental objective, and thus it imposed "on Negro children of the District of Columbia a burden that
constitute[d] an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause." Id. at
499-500; see also Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 732-33 (7th Cir. 1971) (holding HUD liable for
violating the Due Process Clause of the Constitution by knowingly funding the Chicago Housing
Authority as it engaged in deliberately discriminatory practices in the location and population of public
housing projects).
101. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
102. Id. at 484.
103. Id.
407No. 3]
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The Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law & Policy
the First Amendment right of association; the Third Amendment right against
quartering of soldiers in homes during peace time).'0" These amendments
reflected the recognition of a point beyond which government was precluded.' 05
Surely, we would not "allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?"l 0 6
In his concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg pointed out that the Court had
never held that the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment protected only
those rights that the Constitution specifically mentioned by name. 0 7 Instead, the
Court stated many years earlier that the Due Process Clause protected "those
liberties that are so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental."os Moreover:
To hold that a right so basic and fundamental and so deep-rooted in our society
as the right of privacy in marriage may be infringed because that right is not
guaranteed in so many words by the first eight amendments to the Constitution
is to ignore the Ninth Amendment and to give it no effect whatsoever.109
"Privacy" then is a fundamental right, as an essential predicate to liberty.
Shortly after Griswold, the Court identified another, fundamental right not
specified in the text of the Bill of Rights. In United States v. Guest,"o the
Supreme Court declared:
[The] constitutional right to travel from one State to another ... occupies a
position fundamental to the concept of our Federal union. It is a right that has
been firmly established and repeatedly recognized [although] ... [the] right
finds no explicit mention in the Constitution. The reason, it has been suggested,
is that a right so elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a
necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created. In any
event, freedom to travel throughout the United States has long been recognized
as a basic right under the Constitution.111
In Shapiro v. Thompson,1 2 the Court embraced the Guest's conception of
the right to travel when it found that state residency requirements adopted as
a condition of eligibility for welfare benefits improperly. impinged upon the
104. Id.
105. Id. at 485.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 487.
108. Id. at 487.
109. Id. at 491. The Ninth Amendment "specifically states that '[t]he enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."' Id.
110. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
111. Id. at 757-58.
112. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
408 [Vol. XIX
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Imagining a Right to Housing
applicants' right to travel.' 13 In subjecting to strict judicial scrutiny a state
welfare eligibility statute, the Court explained: "in moving from State to
State . . . appellees were exercising a constitutional right, and any classification
which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary
to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional"ll 4 and the
right to interstate travel had long been recognized as a right of constitutional
significance.115 The Court's decision, therefore, did not require an ad hoc
determination as to the social or economic importance of that right." 6 The
practical effect of this ruling was that the states were required to provide for the
needs of these new residents, including housing, food, and medical care.' 17
Before Guest and Shapiro, the Court had sought to identify the precise source
of a right to travel. Four sources had been considered: the Commerce Clause; the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV; the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Three of these sources had been dismissed for varying reasons." 8
In the end, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is perhaps the most
sound basis of the right to travel-as an element of the "'liberty' of which the
citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law.. . . Freedom of move-
ment across frontiers . . . and inside frontiers as well, was a part of our
heritage."" 9 The freedom to travel was viewed as being closely related to rights
of free speech and association. 12 0
B. Rights Become Positive
As stated earlier, beginning in the nineteenth century, the prevailing thought
became that larger societal concerns might prevail over individual rights in some
cases and that in others, new rights should be recognized.12' These new rights
113. Id. at 631.
114. Id. at 634.
115. Id. at 642.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 631-32; see also Saenz v. Cal. Dep't Soc. Servs., 526 U.S. 489, 506 (1999) (holding that a
state may not create classes of welfare recipients based upon length of residence in the state).
118. The Commerce Clause was dismissed because under it, if Congress enacts laws, those laws are
upheld. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283 (1849). The
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV was dismissed by the Court because this clause neither
limits federal power nor prevents a state from distinguishing among its own citizens, but simply
"prevents a state from discriminating against citizens of other states in favor of its own." See Hague v.
CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 511 (1939). The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has
been interpreted to extend only to those "privileges and immunities" which "arise or grow out of the
relationship of United States citizens to the national government." The Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall.
36, 77 (1873).
119. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 670 (1969).
120. Id. at 670.
121. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 786-87 (1964) (describing rights in job
retention, state-issued licenses, and permits, as well as continued receipt of public benefits).
No. 3] 409
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could be different in their aim and contours than natural rights and might
transcend their individual character.12 2 When we speak of a "right," we usually
mean the expectation or freedom to engage or indulge in a specific act or
endeavor, and to insist upon the state's protection of this freedom against
infringement. 123 It may be negative, in the sense of imposing constraints upon
government.124 Or, it may be positive, in the sense that there exists an affirmative
obligation on the part of government to impart or confer the benefit or to facilitate
some act.12 5 While most rights recognized in our political order are conceived as
negative (no deprivation of property or liberty; no infringement of the right to
engage in speech), and in the case of rights in property, it is clear from the text of
our Constitution that its aim was not the spreading or assuring that every person
own a plot of land on which to live and work. Instead, it aimed to enable the
retention or preservation of that land. Yet there are some other positive rights
bestowed in the Constitution, such as citizenship and the right to trial by jury of
one's peers. Full realization of these rights requires affirmative intervention or
assistance from the government. In Gideon v. Wainwright,12 6 the Court found that
the state had an obligation to ensure the assistance of counsel in a felony
prosecution as a safeguard of the Sixth Amendment.12 7 The Court explained that
"[the assistance of counsel] was .. . necessary to insure fundamental human
rights of life and liberty ... . The Sixth Amendment stands as a constant
admonition that if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not
'still be done."' 2 8 Indeed, it seemed an obvious truth, supported by reason and
reflection, that "any person hauled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer,
122. Value rather than things becomes predominant; property becomes "dephysicalized," greatly
broadening its purview. As pressure mounted to find some way of containing the expansion of property,
the view arose to concede that while any valuable interest could be property, it would not necessarily be
considered property merely because it was valuable. Instead, a court would consider such interest to be
property only if public policy so demanded. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth
Century: The Development of the Modem Concept of Property, 28 BuFF. L. REv. 325, 328-30, 357-64
(1980).
123. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 269 (1994).
124. As stated earlier, if the right is a fundamental one, any law apparently impinging on it, is
evaluated by a very rigorous standard of review-"strict scrutiny." "Strict scrutiny," like any legal test,
although subject to the vagaries of imprecision and fluidity, may mean different things in different
contexts, but it at least puts the burden on the government to demonstrate a compelling interest to justify
any infringement. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634 (1969).
125. Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 Wash. L. Q. 659, 681.
Professor Michelman writes that positive rights "pose problems largely because the reciprocity and
boundedness of duties seem gravely threatened by the idea of being duty-bound to contribute actively to
the satisfaction of other people's interest or needs." He points out that "[n]eeds are neither equal, nor
reciprocal, nor quite finite .... [T]he resource requirements for satisfying them may be virtually
limitless." Moreover, he observes, the state's function regarding rights is that of a vindicator; a facilitator
of satisfaction of other interests and needs, not a bearer of duties.
126. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
127. Id. at 343.
128. Id.
410 [Vol. XIX
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Imagining a Right to Housing
cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."l 2 9 The Court
pointed to the essential role of lawyers in the prosecution of crimes:
From the country's very beginning, our state and national constitutions and
laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards
designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every
defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the
poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist
him. A defendant's need for a lawyer is nowhere better stated than in the
moving words of Mr. Justice Sutherland in Powell v. Alabama: 'the right to be
heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right
to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and
sometimes no skill in the science of law.' "
30
Eight years ago, in Tennessee v. Lane, 1 3 the Court considered the issue of
physical access to court as a fundamental right. There, the Court explained that
the duty to accommodate the handicapped was entirely consistent with well-
established due process principles that "'within the limits of practicability, a state
must afford to all individuals a meaningful opportunity to be heard' in the
courts"13 2 and "ordinary considerations of cost and convenience alone cannot
justify a State's failure to provide individuals with a meaningful right of access to
the courts."l 3 3
C. Education is Important, But Falls Short of Fundamental
On other occasions, the Court has recognized the importance of an interest
toward fulfillment of other rights, but has declined to name that interest as a
fundamental right-the right to education being most prominent. John Adams
stated: "liberty cannot be preserved without a general knowledge among the
people, who have a right, from the frame of their nature, to knowledge[, which is]
an inherent and essential right, a right that was established even before
parliament existed."134 While his sentiments might have had a sensible appeal,
the Founders were unwilling to go so far as to impose a duty upon the
government to ensure that that end be achieved. And, the Supreme Court has
since been not willing or able to find such a right existing in the penumbra. In San
129. Id. at 344.
130. Id. at 344-45 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)).
131. 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
132. Id. at 532. The Court identified a number of other "affirmative obligations that flow from this
principle: the duty to waive filing fees in certain family law and criminal cases, the duty to provide
transcripts to criminal defendants seeking review of their convictions, and the duty to provide counsel to
certain criminal defendants." Id. at 532-33.
133. Id. at 533.
134. PAGE SMrrH, JOHN ADAMS 79 (1962).
No. 3] 411
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Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,'35 the plaintiffs asserted that
the State's system of funding schools impermissibly interfered with the exercise
of a "fundamental" right and that accordingly the system must be tested under a
strict standard of judicial review. The Court's recognition of the importance of
education was clear. In Brown v. Board of Education,136 a unanimous Court
recognized that "education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments." 37 The Court stated:
What was said there in the context of racial discrimination has lost none of
its vitality with the passage of time: 'Compulsory school attendance laws
and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of
the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him
for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such
an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right that must
be made available to all on equal terms." 3 8
Although "the grave significance of education both to the individual and to our
society" was beyond question,' 39 the importance of a service performed by the
State does not determine whether it must be regarded as fundamental for
purposes of examination under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court recalled
Justice Harlan's dissent in Shapiro, which admonished that "[v]irtually every
state statute affects important rights." 40 In his view, if the degree of judicial
scrutiny of state legislation fluctuated depending on a majority's view of the
importance of the interest affected, we would have gone "far toward making this
Court a 'super-legislature.'" 4 1 We would, indeed, then be assuming a legislative
role and one for which the Court lacks both authority and competence. The Court
believed that Justice Stewart's response in Shapiro to Justice Harlan's concern
correctly articulated the limits of the fundamental rights rationale employed in
the Court's equal protection decisions. Justice Stewart pronounced:
The Court today does not 'pick out particular human activities, characterize
them as 'fundamental,' and give them added protection.' To the contrary, the
135. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
136. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
137. Id. at 493.
138. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1973) (quoting Brown v. Board of
Ed., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954)).
139. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 283 (W.D. Tex. 1971).
140. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655, 661 (1969).
141. Id.
412 [Vol. XIX
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Imagining a Right to Housing
Court simply recognizes, as it must, an established constitutional right, and
gives to that right no less protection than the Constitution itself demands. 142
But, "picking" is precisely what the Court has done where it has recognized a
right not expressed in the Constitution.
While in San Antonio the Court did not foreclose the possibility of "some
identifiable quantum of education as a constitutionally protected prerequisite to
the meaningful exercise of either [the right to speak or the right to vote],"1 4 3 in
the absence of some radical denial of educational opportunity, the issue was not
decided. Since then, the Court has pointed out that the question of whether some
minimally adequate education is a fundamental right and whether a statute
alleged to discriminatorily infringe that right should be accorded heightened
equal protection review has not yet been definitively settled."'4
D. Interest in Housing As Distinct from Ownership
On the question whether liberty embraces a right to housing, some might
believe that the Court answered "no" in Lindsey v. Normet.14 5 There, tenants were
sued by their landlord for possession because they had not paid their rent. They
had deliberately withheld payment because the landlord had failed to keep the
premises habitable.14 6 Under Oregon law, a landlord had a duty to deliver and
keep premises fit for human habitation for the duration of the lease term.147 While
this duty was a departure from the common law no-repair rule, Oregon still
embraced the concept of dependence of covenants, which meant that the tenant's
right to habitable housing was enforceable as an action for damages.148
Otherwise, the forcible entry and detainer statute guaranteed the landlord a
speedy remedy for the recovery of possession through court action, rather than
self-help in the event of a tenant's breach. 14 9
The complainants challenged the procedural limitations imposed on tenants in
suits brought by landlords under the state's forcible entry and detainer law, and
urged the Court to examine the operation of the statute under "a more stringent
standard than mere rationality."15 0 Under the law, the only defense to an action
for possession based upon non-payment of rent was payment. Furthermore, a
counterclaim for damages or a set-off based upon the landlord's violation of the
142. Id. at 642.
143. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35.
144. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 285-86 (1986) (finding that the case did not require
resolution of the issues and applying a rational basis test).
145. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
146. Id. at 58-59.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 63.
149. Id. at 71.
150. Id. at 73.
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warranty of habitability was not permitted. The tenants argued that the statutory
limitations implicated "fundamental interests which are particularly important to
the poor," such as the "need for decent shelter" and the "right to retain peaceful
possession of one's home."'"' In refusing to find a fundamental constitutional
right, Justice White stated:
We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary housing. But
the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and
economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that document any constitutional
guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality or any recognition of the
right of a tenant to occupy the real property of his landlord beyond the term of
his lease, without the payment of rent ... Absent constitutional mandate, the
assurance of adequate housing and the definition of landlord-tenant relation-
ships are legislative, not judicial, functions.1 52
The framing of the various interests sought to be protected can be seen as perhaps
determinative. The majority saw the case as involving the rights of a landlord,
as a fee owner, but did not embrace the tenant's interest in preserving their
possession, which under prevailing conceptions, was a property interest. Justice
Douglas, in dissent, perceived the interests to be much larger:
[W]here the right is so fundamental as the tenant's claim to his home, the
requirements of due process should be more embracing. In the setting of
modern urban life, the home, even though it be in the slums, is where a man's
roots are. To put him into the street when the slum landlord, not the slum tenant,
is the real culprit deprives the tenant of a fundamental right without any real
opportunity to defend.' 5 3
Thinking deeply about the reasoning for recognizing penumbral rights-to
privacy, to travel, to court-appointed counsel, to physical access to courts-that
is, as necessary in the fulfillment of the liberty interest, then it is difficult to
understand why the Court stopped short in San Antonio and Lindsey. While the
connection between privacy and travel with liberty seems large and direct, a more
substantial ingredient for liberty than shelter is hard to imagine. Participating in
elections, borrowing books from the public library, enrolling one's children in the
local kindergarten-all of these rest upon having a home. The interest in stability
(for work, family, and educational opportunities) all require a home. The interest
in avoiding spending inordinate time trying to secure housing as opposed to time
developing broader capacities for personal and societal enrichment is great. The
right to privacy and hence liberty-for engaging in intimate relations; teaching
151. Id.
152. Id. at 74.
153. Id. at 90.
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Imagining a Right to Housing
and interacting with children; finding solace-cannot be realized without a
sphere of one's own.
What may explain, though not justify, the Court's reluctance to find rights in
education and housing was the Court's doubting its ability to define such
rights.15 4 What is an adequate education? How much should a state spend on
education? What quantity or quality of shelter is required? How long can a
tenancy last? But, this conundrum might have been avoided by not trying to root
the right to housing in ownership. In Poe v. Ullman,'55 Justice Harlan spoke
about the importance of housing that:
Certainly the safeguarding of the home does not follow merely from the
sanctity of property rights. The home derives its pre-eminence as the seat of
family life. And the integrity of that life is something so fundamental that it has
been found to draw to its protection the principles of more than one explicitly
granted Constitutional right.' 56
While the monetary and structural cost of affording this right cannot be denied,
these were not determinative of a right in either Gideon or Shapiro. In any case,
these concerns would not be insurmountable. There is a wealth of expert
knowledge and practice in designing and funding safe, decent, and affordable
housing. 157
In comparing those freedoms and rights currently identified by the Court and
the Constitution with those not yet identified, we see many overlapping aspects.
The former (to vote, free exercise of religion, privacy) aim to enable a human
being to become a rounded self, a fully developed person, to be able to believe
what he does believe, to participate in choosing his government, to be active in
the sphere in which he could produce and create anew. The deprivation of any of
these is readily recognized as de-humanizing, crippling, preventing one person
from being a person in the full sense. The former rights are "self-preserving,
154. In San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36, the Court explained that even if it
were "conceded that some identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to
the meaningful exercise of either right," it had no indication that the present levels of educational
expenditures in Texas fell short. This was not the case of an absolute denial of educational opportunities
to any of its children, but one alleging only relative differences in spending levels and there was no charge
that the system failed to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills
necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in the political process. The
Court could not perceive the appellees' nexus theory that it would be difficult to distinguish interests in
education from the significant personal interests in the basics of decent food and shelter. Id. at 36-37. The
Court thought that there were certain decisions best left to local authorities-those involving judgments
about raising and spending public revenues. Even if the Court were to invalidate the present scheme,
nothing had been offered to replace it. Id.
155. 367 U.S. 497, 551-52 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
156. Id.
157. See generally DAVIDSON & MALLOY, supra note 13; see also a discussion of the federal housing
programs infra notes 176-99 and accompanying text.
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self-asserting, self-developing."' 58 The latter (including education and the right
to housing) fit easily within these notions. Surely, they reflect the same
characteristics. The adjectives defining both classes echo human rights prin-
ciples. But, all rights are political rights in the sense that they depend upon the
political order for their maintenance and enforcement and in the sense of
depending upon the values and beliefs of the political community.' 9
E. The Many Permutations of Rights
So far, I have sought to show that rights derive from many sources and exist in
many guises. Some rights are inherent in the nature of human existence, while
others are constitutional, textual, penumbral, statutory, fundamental, affirmative,
or even negative. An intricate matrix can be established. The level of protection
and deference afforded by the law to rights holders varies depending upon where
a "right" fits within that matrix. To be sure, no right is regarded as absolute,
allowing no abridgement or incursion, but the burdens upon one who would
intrude is amplified based upon where the right is grounded and how deeply held
it is. Incursions into fundamental rights are subjected to strict scrutiny. This
means it must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and be narrowly
tailored toward that end. Other rights can be curtailed upon a showing that the
government's action has a rational basis.' 6 0 Between these two extremes lie many
permutations of analysis. I am arguing here that available and affordable housing
be regarded as a right and that a heightened level of scrutiny be required in the
case of governmental actions that impact availability and affordability.
1. The Rootedness of Housing in Our Traditions
The step in this mysterious process of identifying a fundamental interest in
housing might be easier if we considered the importance of housing as distinct
from property through history. That character can be gleaned from an examina-
tion of our traditions. 16 1
From ancient times, housing was of central importance to society and hence
government. Aristotle defined "polis" as an association of households and the
head of a household was a proprietor whose business it was to manage the
household's property (including slaves) for the benefit of its members. The
household was in the sphere of economics, or household management, and was
quite distinct from politics, which concerned deciding what was best for the
city.16 2 Thus, for Aristotle, the elemental community of which the polis is
158. Friedrich, supra note 30, at 845.
159. Id. at 846.
160. Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
161. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487.
162. ARISTOTLE, OECONOMICA 1:2 (E.S. Forster ed., 1920).
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Imagining a Right to Housing
comprised is the household and the house.16 3 His thought was that the house
should be arranged both with a view to one's possessions and for the health and
well-being of its inhabitants:'" "A house was one of a triad of interrelated
elements: house, household and organic urban community. The house sheltered
the members of the household and afforded them access to a good and healthy
life. The household itself was relatively self-sufficient, as a rule. The head of the
household was united with other household heads in that network of reciprocity
which undergirded the state or urban community."165 To Aristotle:
[A] house was not a solitary, autonomous, self-subsisting unit, even when
occupied by a household, but rather a locus in many partially overlapping
environments or complexes: . . . a locus: in the spatial economy of the
household; in a social environment; in a physical environment that varies in
salubrity and conduciveness to health.166
In pre-capitalist times, land ownership was mainly "functional" since "it
afforded a workman a place to practice his trade and shelter his family,
apprentices, and journeyman."I 6 7 The practice of trade was regulated by guilds,
which provided the city's physical and philosophical orientation. Guild members
provided needed goods and services, but did not aim to amass wealth beyond that
needed for comfortable life.'6 8 In England, the module on which landowning
depended was that of "burgage," which was an urban plot that contained a house,
yard, and garth. While they could be extended backward from the street,
sometimes encroaching upon the ostensibly public lands, it was clear that
burgages existed to provide for the land needs of wealthy city men, not to
enhance their personal wealth.' 6 9
During the Revolutionary War era, at least half of all household heads were not
landowners, but renters and very poor. Most leases were very long term and
inherited by sons or other relatives and thereby held by one family for several
generations.'7 o The provision of housing in the early eighteenth century in
163. Id.
164. Id. at I:6.
165. Joseph J. Spengler, Population Pressure, Housing, and Habitat, 32 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 191,
192 (1967).
166. Id. at 193.
167. James E. Vance, Jr., Land Assignment in the PreCapitalist, Capitalist, and Post Capitalist City,
47 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 101 (1971).
168. Id. at 105.
169. Id. at 102. The prevailing conception was that landowners used rather than possessed the land,
which meant that the landowner's "valuation of it was a functional rather than a capitalized one. In such
context, locations were not relative but absolute; to exist within a guild area was necessary for the proper
practice of a trade and for the receipt of the social beneficence of that organization. In a true sense the
value of land in the Middle Ages was the value of social association, and the assignment of sites was
accomplished within a matrix of social rather than economic decisions." Id. at 103.
170. GREGORY A. STIVERSON, POVERTY IN A LAND OF PLENTY, TENANCY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
MARYLAND 40 (1977). But, consider that William Penn had been granted 45,000 square miles of land to
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industrial cities was largely undertaken by industrialists. In order to ensure a
labor supply for the newly launched factories, it was necessary to construct
housing conveniently located near the factories.' 7' While the quality and
spaciousness of housing made available varied depending upon the hierarchy
within the workforce, it was of solid construction and not devoid of all aesthetic
features.' 72 As the industrial paternalism that urged the provision of housing
waned, laborers were left to their own means. Society's embrace of capitalism
changed the prevailing attitudes about landholding. There was separation of
employment from the furnishing of housing; and one's rent-paying ability
became the determinant of the quality and location of housing.' 7 3 Class and status
were also defined by where one lived.17 4 Housing became a symbol of status and
a rent-providing commodity.'75 Now, in the post-capitalist world, the availability
of decent housing depends in large measure upon economic status.
Our traditions demonstrate a long-standing governmental commitment to
providing housing to the poor. The federal government has subsidized both the
demand and supply sides of the market for housing.17 6 It entered the supply side,
owning and operating rental housing for the poor, during the Great Depression' 7
under the Housing Act of 1937.178 In his second inaugural address, President
Roosevelt impressed upon the nation that one-third of its citizens was "ill-
dole out as he saw fit and to his personal advantage. See Sharon V. Salinger, Spaces, Inside and Outside,
in Eighteenth-Century Philadelphia, 26 J. INTERDISC. HIsT. 1, 10 (1995).
171. John Coolidge, Low-Cost Housing: The New England Tradition, 14 NEW ENG. Q. 6 (1941).
172. Id. at 15. The female laborers were often housed six to eight girls per room, two to a bed. Id.
However, the day laborers were not included in industrialists' plans and were largely relegated to
"miserable hovels," clustered about some useless piece of property. But, these laborers represented only
some 5 percent of the population. Id. at 17.
173. Vance, supra note 167, at 113.
174. Id. at 113.
175. See generally SUNG BOK KIM, LANDLORD AND TENANT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK: MANORIAL
SOCIETY 1664-1775, at 129, 142, 234 (1978) (describing how by the mid-1700s, New York contained as
many as thirty great estates, a state of affairs very close to feudalism and not without periodic violence
where tenants rose up, but rents were reasonable and tenant obligations were not strictly enforced).
176. See generally Shelby D. Green, The Public Housing Tenancy: Variations on the Common Law
That Give Security of Tenure and Control, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 681 (1994) (discussing the history of
public housing programs); Cara Hendrickson, Racial Desegregation and Income Deconcentration in
Public Housing, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 35 (2002) (discussing the government policies that
resulted in the concentration of tenants in public housing by race and income).
177. Under legislation enacted as part of the New Deal, the Public Works Administration built close to
21,000 public housing units between 1933 and 1937. ELIZABETH WOOD, THE BEAUTIFUL BEGINNINGS, THE
FAILURE TO LEARN: 50 YEARS OF PUBLIC HOUSING IN AMERICA 2-7 (1982); see also K.C. Parsons,
Clarence Stein and the Greenbelt Towns, 56 J. AM. PLAN. Ass'N 161, 161 (1990).
178. 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (2006). See generally Fred Fuchs, Introduction to HUD Conventional
Public Housing, Section 8 Existing Housing, Voucher and Subsidized Housing Programs, Part I,
25 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 782 (1991); Green, supra note 176; Michael H. Schill, Distressed Public
Housing: Where Do We Go From Here?, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 497 (1993); Michael H. Schill, Privatizing
Federal Low Income Housing Assistance: The Case of Public Housing, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 878 (1990);
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL HOUSING TASK FORCE, A DECENT PLACE TO LIVE (1988), reprinted in Senate
Hearings 689, 100th Cong., 2d. Sess. 133, 172-75 (1988).
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Imagining a Right to Housing
housed," 7 9 much of this the result of the Great Depression when hundreds
of thousands of homeowners lost their homes to foreclosure and private
construction almost came to a standstill.'so Those who lost their homes had to
move to slum tenements because decent and affordable housing was unavail-
able.' 8
Long before the Depression, the need to address the unsanitary housing con-
ditions (including overcrowding, inadequate waste disposal and flimsy con-
struction) confronting the poor was pushed by social reformers who asserted
that such conditions were breeding grounds for disease and social dysfunction.
Some cities responded at first by enacting tenement laws and then building
codes to regulate construction quality and utilities.18 2 While housing codes,
which mandated minimum standards for the health and safety for all private
dwellings, became almost universal due in part to federal encouragement
offered by the Housing Act of 1954,183 they were not designed to guarantee a
decent home as envisioned by Congress under the Housing Act of 1937.184
Indeed, as recently as 2007, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that a
substantial number of existing housing structures fell below minimum standards
for habitation.' 8 5
Despite great opposition from the private real estate industry, the federal
government programs continued to provide construction work during the
Depression.18 6 In 1949, Congress reaffirmed its commitment to providing
179. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Second Inaugural Address of Franklin D. Roosevelt (Jan. 20,
1937), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edul20th-century/froos2.asp. Roosevelt went on to note that
"the test of our progress is not whether we add more to the abundance of those who have too much, it is
whether we provide enough for those who have too little." Id.; see also Alfred M. Clark, III, Can America
Afford to Abandon a National Housing Policy?, 6 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & Clwfy. DEV. L. 185, 185
(1997). At first, the Public Works Administration purchased land and constructed public housing. In 1935,
this project was struck down as beyond the eminent domain power of the federal government. United
States v. Certain Lands, 78 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1935). Congress got around this limitation by providing
funds to a federal agency which in turn provided loans, grants, and contributions to local public housing
agencies to construct and manage public housing projects. See Alexander von Hoffman, A Study in
Contradictions: The Origins and Legacy of the Housing Act of 1949, 11 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 299, 302
(2000).
180. Green, supra note 176, at 686.
18 1. Rachel G. Bratt, Public Housing: The Controversy and Contribution, in CRITICAL PERSPEcTIVES
ON HOUSING 335, 337-38 (Rachel G. Bratt et al. eds., 1986).
182. See RICHARD PLUNZ, A HISTORY OF HOUSING IN NEW YORK CITY 21-49 (1990). Plunz recounts that
as early as 1856, the New York State Legislature established a formal commission to study the problem of
unhealthy, substandard housing. Id. at 21. A decade later, a comprehensive building code was enacted
followed in 1867 by the first Tenement Housing Act. Id. at 22. The Tenement Housing Act Laws 1901,
ch. 334 § 112 (1901) was amended in 1879, 1901, and again in 1919. Id. at 27, 85, 123. See also
Hendrickson, supra note 176.
183. See ROBERT ELLICKSON & VICKI BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 468-69 (2005); Hendrickson, supra
note 176.
184. Green, supra note 176, at 687.
185. In re Adoption of NJAC 5:94 & 5.95, 914 A. 2d 348 (N.J Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007).
186. See Dana Miller, HOPE VI and Title VIII: How a Justifying Government Purpose Can Overcome
the Disparate Impact Problem, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1277, 1279 (2003); Schill, Where Do We Go From
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housing with the Housing Act of 1949, declaring a national policy of "a decent
home and a suitable living environment for every American family .... That
Act aimed not only to enable the construction of more than 800,000 new public
housing units within six years of passage, but also to launch slum clearance and
urban renewal efforts.188 Those construction goals had to be curtailed when the
country entered the Korean War in 1950. President Truman reduced the number
of new units to 30,000 in order to avoid shortages of construction materials and to
hold back inflation in the face of the War.' 89 Despite the overt commitment to
public housing, in the decades since the Korean War, Congress has been much
less generous in appropriating funds.' 90 This reluctance was in no small measure
due to the reputations that public housing projects had obtained-for high crime
and social desolation. In 1973, President Nixon declared a moratorium on all
federal housing programs,' 9 ' during which, the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974 was passed,19 2 which aimed to shift some of the cost of
housing to the tenants 93 and to emphasize demand-side subsidies. The most
successful form of demand-side subsidy was the Section 8 program that provided
direct subsidies to recipients to acquire housing in privately owned buildings.194
These subsidies have almost eclipsed those for the construction of traditional
public housing.19 5
Here?, supra note 178, at 502; Schill, Privatizing Federal Low Income Housing Assistance, supra note
178, at 904 (pointing out that slum clearance was included in the Housing Act of 1937 in order to mollify
the private real estate industry). Other measures aimed to quell the opposition of the private industry
included requirements that public housing be modest "not be of elaborate or expensive design or
materials, and that economy be promoted both in construction and administration." Housing Act of 1937,
ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437). See also Hendrickson, supra note 176,
at 37.
187. 42 U.S.C. § 1425(b) (1949) (repealed 1990).
188. von Hoffman, supra note 179, at 310. This number was thought to represent only ten percent of
what was needed to meet the nation's total housing needs. Id.
189. Id. at 311.
190. The number of units constructed under next three presidential administrations declined
significantly: While President Truman sought to increase the allocation to 75,000 units the following
year, Congress allowed for only 50,000; President Eisenhower reduced construction of public housing, in
his first term, requesting funds for only 35,000 units a year, and requesting no funds for public housing in
his second term. Id. at 312, 314-15. President Johnson requested construction more aggressively than did
President Kennedy. Id. at 314; Hendrickson, supra note 176.
191. von Hoffman, supra note 179, at 320.
192. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (codified as
amended in 42 U.S.C. § 1437(f) (2001)).
193. Currently, tenants may be required to pay up to thirty percent of their total income for rent. Thirty
percent of total income is widely considered to be the most that low-income persons should spend on
housing without risking extreme deprivation in their overall living standards, and some have such low
incomes that even thirty percent is more than they can afford. In the early years of public housing, tenants
were a bit better off and could pay more for housing. The 1949 Act largely limited public housing to the
very poor, which meant lower rents and the need for greater federal subsidies for operating and
maintenance costs. Operating expenses include mostly utilities, ordinary maintenance (upkeep and minor
repairs), administration, and insurance. Hendrickson, supra note 176, at 39-40.
194. 42 U.S.C. § 1437(f) (2001).
195. von Hoffman, supra note 179, at 320.
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Imagining a Right to Housing
Other demand-side federal government housing subsidies include the creation
of the Federal Housing Administration, which provides mortgage insurance for
low- to moderate-income borrowers; 19 6 federal tax benefits; 19 7 the Low-Income
Housing Tax Credit program;198 and low-interest rate loans to private devel-
opers. 19
III. PROTECTING ACCESS AND RETENTION
While ensuring availability and affordability would be a new position, the
Court has long protected access to and the retention of housing. This protection
came not from provisions in the literal text of the Constitution, but through an
interpretation aimed at securing other important express rights.
A. Constitutional Bases
Fundamentally, the Constitution protects the right to acquire and to retain
property on a basis available to all citizens as a component of the privileges and
immunities guaranteed by the Constitution.2 0 0 By express language, it is clear
that among the rights guaranteed to the citizens of this country is the right to own
and enjoy property. Under the Fifth Amendment, property cannot be taken
without due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment extends these prohibi-
tions to the states. 2 0 ' But, in order for a cause of action for the denial of privileges
and immunities to be asserted, there must be some state action.
196. The FHA was created by the National Housing Act of 1934, 12 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006) (original
version at ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934)). The Act also authorized the creation of Federal National
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and later the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie
Mac) in order to create a secondary market for mortgages insured by FHA, further facilitating home
ownership by ensuring greater liquidity to banks. 12 U.S.C. § 1452, 1716. See generally David
Wheelock, The Federal Response to Home Mortgage Distress: Lessons from the Great Depression,
90 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. Louis REV. 133, 137 (2008), available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/
publications/review/08/05/Wheelock.pdf.
197. Most prominent is the deductibility from taxable income of mortgage interest. 26 U.S.C.
§ 163(h)(3)(A)(i) (2006).
198. 26 U.S.C. § 42 (2006). See generally NAT'L COUNCIL OF STATE Hous. AGENCIES, 2011 Housing
Credit Fact Sheet, https://www.ncsha.org/resource/201 1-housing-credit-fact-sheet (last visited Mar. 16,
2012).
199. Under Section 235 of the National Housing Act, HUD provided assistance to low-income
purchasers of homes by insuring their mortgages against default and by making a portion of their monthly
mortgage payments. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1715Z(i), (a). The housing was built by a private developer who
obtained mortgage commitments from a HUD-approved lender. 24 C.F.R. § 235.39(a). Upon HUD
approval, Section 235 funding sufficient to subsidize the mortgages on the proposed houses was reserved
for the ultimate purchasers. See generally Green, supra note 176, at 696; Peter Salsich, A Place to Call
Home?Affordable Housing Issues in America: Article: Toward A Policy of Heterogeneity: Overcoming A
Long History of Socioeconomic Segregation in Housing, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 459 (2007) (discussing
the history of federal and state support and initiatives for housing low-income persons and families).
200. Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution guarantees to the citizens of each state all the "Privileges
and Immunities of citizens in the several states." U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2.
201. "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States." U.S. Const. art. XIV, § 1.
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The Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law & Policy
1. Privileges and Immunities
In Shelley v. Kraemer,20 2 the Court found that the enforcement by injunction
of a private racially restrictive covenant to be state action, sustaining a challenge
to the covenant by the purchasers of property burdened by the covenant.20 3
However, the Court, early on in the opinion, pointed out that "restrictive
covenants, standing alone, cannot be regarded as violative of any rights
guaranteed .. . by the Fourteenth Amendment." 204 This means that if all landown-
ers conspired to deny housing to blacks and all adhered to the conspiracy, there
might have been nothing the state could do. However, the Court explained that
equality in the enjoyment of property rights was regarded by the Founders of the
Fourteenth Amendment as an essential pre-condition to the realization of other
basic civil rights and liberties which the Amendment was intended to guaran-
tee,2 05 and "freedom from discrimination by the States in the enjoyment of
property rights was among the basic objectives" of that amendment.2 06 Thus, any
law or state enforcement of a private agreement, purporting to restrict the ability
of persons to own and reside on property in certain areas, solely on account of
race cannot be squared with the Fourteenth Amendment.2 07
In Barrows v. Jackson,20 8 the Court found a state court award of damages for
the breach of a restrictive covenant was also a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, extending the rationale in Shelley v.
Kraemer209 However, Chief Justice Vinson, in dissent, seemed to find merit in
the belief held by the covenantors that:
[A]ny influx of non-Caucasian neighbors would impair their enjoyment of their
properties," that 'whether right or wrong, each had a right to control the use of
his property against that event and to exact a promise from his or her neighbor
that he or she would act accordingly . . . Moreover, we must at this pleading
stage of the case, accept it is a fact that respondent has thus far profited from the
execution of this bargain; observance of the covenant by petitioners raised the
value of respondent's properties. By this suit, the plaintiffs sought only to have
respondent disgorge that which was gained at the expense of depreciation in her
neighbor's property.210
Justice Vinson went on:
202. 334 U.S. I (1948).
203. Id. at 19.
204. Id. at 13.
205. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1948).
206. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 20.
207. Id. at 11.
208. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
209. Id. at 254 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)).
210. 346 U.S. at 267-68.
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Imagining a Right to Housing
[W]e can only interfere in this case if the Fourteenth Amendment compels us to
do so, for that is the only basis upon which respondent seeks to sustain her
defense. While we are limited to enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the state courts are not; they may decline to recognize the covenants for other
reasons. Since we must rest our decision on the Constitution alone, we must set
aside predictions on social policy and adhere to the settled rules which restrict
the exercise of our power of judicial review-remembering that the only
211restraint upon this power is our own sense of restraint.
By these expressions of "restraint," Justice Vinson seemed not inclined to
consider how these restrictive covenants would be incompatible with the over-
arching aims of the Constitution, that is, to ensure equality of enjoyment of
privileges and immunities.
The question whether states may take a neutral stance in the face of known
discriminatory practices or must act to prohibit discrimination was addressed in
Reitman v. Mulkey.212 There, the Court approved the position taken by the
California Supreme Court in striking down a constitutional amendment adopted
by citizen referendum, which by its terms barred the state legislature from
adopting any measure that limited the right of a landowner to refuse to sell or rent
housing property to any person, even on account of race. The California Supreme
Court undertook to analyze the constitutionality of the state law in terms of its
"immediate objectives," its "ultimate effect," and it "historical context," and the
conditions existing prior to its enactment. Though the court conceded that the
State was permitted to take a neutral position with respect to private racial
discrimination and that the State was not bound by the federal Constitution to
forbid private racial discriminatory practices, it concluded that a prohibited state
involvement could be found "even where the state can be charged with only
encouraging," rather than commanding discrimination.2 13 The state court could
"conceive of no other purpose for an application of the amendment aside from
authorizing the perpetration of a purported private discrimination." 2 14 The
amendment was intended to repeal two civil rights acts that were aimed at
prohibiting discrimination.2 15 The ultimate impact of the amendment was to
encourage and significantly involve the state in private racial discrimination
contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 16 The bottom-line effect of the law was
that:
211. Id. at 269. It is fair to ponder the result if a non-Caucasian had been a party to the suit, claiming
injury from having to pay a higher purchase price or from the seller's refusal to sell out of fear of liability
for breaching the covenants, whether Justice Vinson would have taken a different meaning from those
facts.
212. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
213. Id. at 375.
214. Id. at 375.
215. Id. at 376.
216. Id.
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The Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law & Policy
[A] right to discriminate, including the right to discriminate on racial grounds,
was now embodied in the State's basic charter, immune from legislative,
executive, or judicial regulation at any level of the state government. Those
practicing racial discrimination would no longer need to rely solely on their
personal choice. They could now invoke express constitutional authority, free
from censure or interference of any kind from official sources. 217
The Court pointed out that it had never attempted the "impossible task" of
formulating an infallible test for determining whether the State "in any of its
manifestations" has become significantly involved in private discriminations.2 18
Instead, the determination must be made by weighing all the circumstances on a
case-by-case basis. The view of the State of California was that the amendment
would significantly encourage and involve the State in private discrimination.
The Court concluded that it had been presented with no persuasive considerations
indicating that these judgments should be overturned.2 19
2. Badges and Incidents of Slavery:
The Thirteenth Amendment and Civil Rights Acts
In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 2 2 0 the Court found the Civil Rights Act of
1866,221 which by its terms reached acts of purely private discrimination, a valid
exercise of congressional power pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment.22 2
There, the plaintiff, a black person, sought to purchase certain real property, but
was refused on account of his race.223 The Court read the Thirteenth Amendment
as not merely a prohibition of state laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an
absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude was not to exist in the
United States.22 4 Further, under that Amendment, Congress had the power to
determine and to eradicate the badges and incidents of slavery.2 25 Congress could
eliminate restraints upon "those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil
freedom, namely, the same right ... to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, and convey
property, as is enjoyed by white citizens."2 26
It is interesting to note these fundamental rights pertaining to housing stood out
217. Id. at 377.
218. Id. at 378.
219. Id. at 381.
220. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
221. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2006). The Civil Rights Act of 1866, passed to effectuate the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment, provides: "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every
State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property." Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2006)).
222. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443 (1968).
223. Id. at 412.
224. Id. at 438.
225. Id. at 439.
226. Id. at 441 (citing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883)).
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Imagining a Right to Housing
among other interests a free person would hold. In the Civil Rights Cases,2 2 7
where such other interests were at issue, the Court did not read the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 as expansively, concluding:
[The act of ... the owner of the inn, the public conveyance or place of
amusement, refusing . .. accommodation [cannot be] justly regarded as impos-
ing any badge of slavery or servitude upon the applicant . . . It would be
running the slavery argument into the ground to make it apply to every act of
discrimination which a person may see fit to make as to the guests he will
entertain, or as to the people he will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit
to his concert or theatre, or deal with in other matters of intercourse or
business.228
The Civil Rights Act of 1871 was enacted largely to deal with the growing
terror of the Ku Klux Klan.22 9 When first enacted, it imposed liability upon
persons, who "under color of any law ... cause . . . the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States." 23 0
Congressman Bingham, the primary sponsor of the Act, explained that Congress
intended to provide for better enforcement of the Constitution and laws of the
United States. 2 3 ' Revisions made in 1874 were intended to "amend the
imperfections of the original text" without altering its meaning, such that the new
language protected "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws" of the federal government.2 32 The new language signaled
Congress' "accepted understanding that the Privileges and Immunities Clause
was to be co-extensive with rights found within the text of the Constitution as
well as rights defined by Congress exercising its authority as defined by Article I
of the Constitution."23 3
3. Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution protects individuals against govern-
ment taking of their private property, except for a public use and only then with
227. 109 U.S. at 3.
228. Id. at 24-25. Mr. Justice Harlan dissented in the Civil Rights Cases, expressing the view that
"such discrimination practiced by corporations and individuals in the exercise of their public or
quasi-public functions is a badge of servitude the imposition of which Congress [could] prevent under its
power, by appropriate legislation, to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment. Id. at 4. Of course, the position
taken by the Court in the Civil Rights Cases, was largely overruled by the enactment of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, which outlawed discrimination in public accommodations. See Heart of Atlanta Hotel v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
229. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 31, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)).
230. Id.
231. Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., Ist Sess. App. 81 (1871).
232. Act of June 27, 1866, ch. 140, § 1, 14 Stat. 74.
233. William J. Rich, Why "Privileges or Immunities"? An Explanation of the Framers' Intent,
42 AKRON L. REV. Il11, 1117 (2009).
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The Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law & Policy
just compensation. However, in Kelo v. City ofNew London,2 34 the Court gave no
special consideration to the fact that the property being taken by a city consisted
of homes that the owners had resided in for many years. The Court agreed that
economic redevelopment is a valid public purpose and deferred to the city for that
determination.2 35
B. Statutory Bases
Over the decades, the Court has protected rights in housing as expressed in
various statutes.
1. Fair Housing Act
The Fair Housing Act was enacted in 1968.236 It makes it unlawful to "refuse
to sell or rent ... or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any
person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin." A
dwelling can be made otherwise unavailable by, among other things, action that
limits the availability of affordable housing.2 37 The Fair Housing Act can be
violated by either intentional discrimination or disparate impact on a protected
class.23 8
2. Public Housing
Under the National Housing Act, which authorizes the construction and
funding of public housing, tenants are entitled to perpetual renewal of their
leases, except that termination may be had for good cause. 2 3 9 They are entitled to
due process (notice of the charges and an opportunity to contest them) before
termination of their tenancies. 2 4 0 However, in U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development v. Rucker,2 4 1 the Court upheld the termination of a public
housing tenancy for misconduct of a family member, even when the evicted
tenant did not participate in the misconduct and had no ability to control the
family member. The Court found that the National Housing Act's plain language
234. 546 U.S. 469 (2005).
235. Id. at 485-86, 490.
236. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (a) (2006).
237. See, e.g., Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 928-29, 938-39
(2d Cir. 1988); Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1059, 1062-64 (4th Cir. 1982); Resident
Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 130 (3d Cir. 1977).
238. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375 (3d Cir. 2011); Magner
v. Gallagher, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2011); Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. Wind Gap Mun. Auth., 421 F.3d 170, 176
(3d Cir. 2005); National Cmty. Reinv. Coal. v. Accredited Home Lenders Holding Co., 573 F.Supp. 2d 70
(D.D.C. 2008).
239. Discussed at infra notes 176-99 and accompanying text.
240. Green, supra note 176.
241. 535 U.S. 125 (2002).
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Imagining a Right to Housing
unambiguously required lease terms that give local public housing authorities the
discretion to terminate the lease of a tenant when a member of the household or a
guest engages in drug-related activity, regardless of whether the tenant knew, or
should have known, of the drug-related activity. 24 2 Congress' decision not to
impose any qualification in the statute, combined with its use of the term "any"
to modify "drug-related criminal activity," precludes any knowledge require-
ment.2 43 Moreover, by the Act, Congress sought to protect other residents from
the violence typically associated with drug activity.2 44
3. Rent Control
The Supreme Court upheld a rent control ordinance in Pennell v. City of
San Jose,245 rejecting a takings and equal protection challenge. The ordinance
contained a provision that allowed a hearing officer to consider, among other
factors, the hardship to a tenant when determining whether to approve a
landlord's proposed rent increase in excess of eight percent. The landlords made a
facial challenge that the provision obligated private landlords to assume public
burdens without just compensation, thereby violating their rights under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court ruled that the ordinance was not facially
invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the
tenant hardship provision represented a rational attempt to accommodate the
conflicting interests of protecting tenants from burdensome rent increases while
at the same time insuring that landlords were guaranteed a fair return on their
investment.24 6
IV. FACILITATING HOUSING AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY
THROUGH EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS THEORIES
The principle of equal protection .proscribes actions by a state or its
247instrumentalities that invidiously discriminate against persons. While a
classification on the basis of race or religion is inherently suspect, placing the
burden on the government to justify that classification by a compelling
governmental interest, such classifications are not the only occasions for equal
protection claims. A classification that unduly impacts a fundamental interest also
requires strong justification.2 48 Where the government adopts programs, appropri-
ates funds, and enacts legislation that disproportionately impacts certain impor-
242. 535 U.S. at 130.
243. 535 U.S. at 131.
244. Id.
245. 485 U.S. 1 (1988).
246. Id. at 13. Inasmuch as no occasion had arisen whereby such a hardship had been established, the
Court limited its ruling to the facial challenge. Id. at 14-15.
247. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1.
248. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 638.
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tant interests of similarly situated persons, equal protection issues are raised. A
case for heightened scrutiny could be asserted in the following scenario: a city
might act to develop a waterfront with the larger aim of revitalizing the
community. The project might include housing and commercial uses. To enlist
developers to undertake the effort, the government offers to use its powers of
eminent domain to acquire property, to contribute to the costs of development
through grants, and also to provide tax subsidies to the developer. If the
government does not also offer subsidies for low-income households for housing
in the new development, then it is creating two classes of persons affected by the
effort-those able to buy or rent at market rates and those who are not-but
treating them differently. Those who purchase would benefit from the tax
subsidies, while those who cannot purchase receive no comparable benefit. But
the difference that would obtain if housing were deemed fundamental would be
that unless the government could articulate a compelling governmental interest
(something other than an interest in protecting the public fisc) for the disparate
treatment, the programs could be struck down.24 9 In other words, the level of
judicial scrutiny, if strict, may well lead to greater regard for facilitating the
acquisition of housing by those who need this assistance.
A. Existing Obstacles to Success Under Constitutional Theories
There are several reasons why challenges as just described have failed under
current equal protection analysis, the most significant being the absence of "proof
of racially discriminatory intent or purpose."25 0 Much of the reason for a lack of
affordable housing has been the persistence of facially neutral zoning ordinances
limiting uses to "single-family dwellings" on large lots and precluding multiple
unit dwellings.25 1 In zoning matters, the Supreme Court has shown a great deal
of deference to decisions by municipalities, even when they make land use
extremely restrictive.2 52
In one of the earliest Supreme Court cases on the power of municipalities to
zone land within their boundaries, Euclid v. Ambler Realty,2 5 3 the Court ruled that
a zoning ordinance would be upheld if there was a rational relationship between
the ordinance and the municipality's interest in the protection of health, safety,
morals or general welfare.2 54 That relationship would be found to exist if the
issue was "fairly debatable." 255 That case involved an act by the Village of
Euclid, Ohio to rezone certain areas of the town, which had the effect of limiting
249. See id., at 631-632 (rejecting the concern for budgetary issues as a justification for the waiting
period for welfare benefits as it infringed upon the right to travel).
250. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp, 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).
251. Salsch, supra note 194.
252. Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 392.
255. Id. at 388.
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Imagining a Right to Housing
much of plaintiffs' theretofore-undeveloped land to certain uses, precluding other
uses for which the landowner thought the land was best suited.256 Before the
ordinance, the land was valued at $10,000 per acre, but after it was valued at
$2500 per acre.257 The landowner made a facial challenge to the ordinance, as he
had not attempted to use the land in a way that was precluded by the ordinance.
A facial challenge succeeds if the plaintiff can demonstrate that under no set of
facts could the law be applied in a fashion that was constitutional. The claim was
only that the ordinance made it theoretically impossible to realize the expected
value of the property prior to the ordinance-a substantive due process
violation.25 9
But Euclid did not consider whether an ordinance could be struck down on
equal protection grounds-that is, that the ordinance treated similarly situated
landowners differently. The Court has nonetheless ruled that municipalities may
enact zoning ordinances that preclude certain kinds of housing in designated
areas, so long as there is a rational basis supporting the measures.2 60 Ironically,
though municipalities have asserted that zoning land for single family dwellings
serves to support the family as important socializing institutions, such zoning
operates to exclude families who cannot afford single-family dwellings from
seeking the quiet and solitude of the communities so zoned. Moreover, the Court
has found that nothing in the constitution requires cities to take advantage of
available funds for the construction of affordable housing. 2 6 ' The Court has also
taken a rather narrow view of the requisite standing for challenging zoning
decisions.2 62
In all of these contexts, the Court has not applied any degree of heightened
scrutiny in the absence of evidence that the municipality's aim was to exclude
persons based on race. While the level of scrutiny that the Court gives to equal
256. Id. at 384.
257. Id. at 384.
258. Id. at 386.
259. Id.
260. See e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp, 429 U.S. at 265-66; Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (upholding single family zoning, recognizing governmental
interest in encouraging "family values, youth values and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air
mak[ing] the area a sanctuary for people").
261. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 143 (1971).
262. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). There, the Supreme Court ruled that non-residents of a
town lacked standing to challenge a zoning ordinance which they maintained effectively excluded
persons of low and moderate income from living in the town, in contravention of the First, Ninth, and
Fourteenth Amendments and in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983. Id. at 493. A challenger to a
town's ordinance must allege specific, concrete facts demonstrating that the challenged practices harm
him, and that he personally would benefit in a tangible way from the court's intervention. Id. at 499-500.
In the case, none of the plaintiffs had any particular interest in any property found in the town, nor was
any housing within their means precluded by the ordinance, instead relying on the remote possibility that
their circumstances might be improved. Id. at 504. The perversity of the result was that because the
plaintiffs could not afford housing in the town, they lacked standing to challenge an ordinance that
rendered the housing in the town unaffordable.
429No. 3]
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protection claims will vary depending upon whether those adversely impacted
are members of a discrete and insular minority group or a protected class under
the law, the Court has declined to find that poverty or economic status is a
protected class.2 63 Nevertheless, poverty often correlates very strongly with race
as well as certain ethnicities. 26 In this respect, ordinances, which are neutral on
their face, but which have a disproportionate impact upon certain groups should
be subjected to heightened scrutiny. And, while it is the case that whether the
Court applies heightened scrutiny has depended not only upon the groups
affected, but also upon the protected interest affected by the classification,2 65
absent recognition of housing as an important interest, no heightened scrutiny
will be had.
The three cases that have reached the Court involving measures by towns to
facilitate the construction of affordable housing have reached disparate results.
On the one hand, the Court concluded that giving citizens a say in whether to
authorize such housing alone does not violate equal protection rights.26 6 On the
other hand, where a city charter provided for referendums only for ordinances
regulating real estate on the basis of race, such a classification did affront the
Equal Protection Clause.26 7
263. San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973).
264. See e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 377 F.3d 949, 972 (9th Cir.
2006); Bonton v. City of New York, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22105, *13 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Shani King, The
Family Law Canon in a (Post) Racial Era, 72 OHIO ST. L. J. 575, 616 (2011); UNITED STATES CENSUS,
CHILD POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 2009 & 2010: SELECTED RACE GROUPS & HISPANIC ORIGIN 1, 3,
(2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/201 1pubs/acsbrlo-05.pdf (reporting that black children
represented 26.6% of the population of children in poverty, but only 14.4% of all children; that 38.2% of
all black children were poor, while white and Asian children had poverty rates below the national
average).
265. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (stating that "any classification which serves
to penalize the exercise of [a constitutional] right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling
governmental interest, is unconstitutional").
266. In James v. Valtierra, the Court upheld an article to the state constitution providing that no
low-rent housing project should be developed, constructed, or acquired in any manner by a state public
body until the project was approved by a majority of those voting at a community election. The Court
found nothing per se unconstitutional about the referendum procedure, where the constitutional
amendment created no classifications based upon race. 402 U.S. at 141. Instead, it pointed out that a wide
variety of governmental acts required enactment by referenda. Id. at 142. Given that public housing
projects, by their nature imposed burdens (municipal services, but lower tax revenues) upon the
municipalities in which they were situated, it was not unreasonable to give the citizens a say in whether to
undertake those burdens. Id. at 143.
267. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969). There, citizens of Akron, Ohio, amended their city
charter to require that any ordinance regulating real estate on the basis of race could not take effect until
the ordinance was approved by the electorate in a mandatory referendum. Id. at 387. The Court held that
the amendment created a classification explicitly based upon race because it required that laws dealing
with racial matters could take effect only if they survived a mandatory referendum, while other housing
ordinances took effect (upon enactment by the city council) without any special election. Id. at 391. The
racial classification created a special burden on racial minorities within the governmental process by
making this process more difficult for minorities to secure legislation on their own behalf. Id. at 391.
Because the City of Akron could not justify this racial discrimination, the Court found a denial of equal
protection and held that the mandatory referendum was unconstitutional. Id. at 393.
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Imagining a Right to Housing
Most recently, the Court upheld a referendum to block an ordinance providing
for affordable housing, despite clear evidence that the referendum was motivated
by racial animus. In City of Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio v. Buckeye Community Hope
Foundation,2 6 8 the Court essentially upheld the right of citizens acting through
the referendum process to adopt measures to affect adversely members of other
racial groups. 2 6 9 There, the city adopted an ordinance authorizing a nonprofit
corporation to construct a low-income housing complex.270 A group of citizens
filed a formal petition with the city requesting that the ordinance be repealed or
submitted to a popular vote.2 7 1 The city's charter provided that an ordinance
challenged by a petition could not go into effect until approved by a majority of
the voters.2 72 Immediately upon the submission of the proposal for the housing,
residents of the town expressed opposition.2 73 Initially, the developer agreed to
various conditions, including that it build an earthen wall surrounded by a fence
on one side of the complex.2 74 After the planning commission approved the
plans, public opposition resurfaced and coalesced into a referendum petition
drive.2 75 Citizens expressed various concerns: that the development would cause
crime and drug activity to escalate, that families with children would move in,
and that the complex would attract a population similar to the one in the town's
only African-American neighborhood.2 76 The voters passed the referendum
thereby blocking the ordinance from going into effect. 277 The Ohio Supreme
Court declared the referendum unconstitutional, holding that the state constitu-
tion authorizes referendums only in relation to legislative acts, not administrative
acts, such as site-plan ordinances.2 78 The city thereafter issued the building
permits and construction commenced. 7 While the state court litigation was
ongoing, the developer brought suit in federal court seeking injunction against
the referendum and an order that the city issue the building permits. 28 0 It
maintained that in allowing the site plan ordinance to be submitted to the electors
through referendum, the city violated the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the Fair Housing Act.28 1
The United States Supreme Court rejected the challenge on two grounds. First,
there was no proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose behind the
268. 538 U.S. 188 (2003).
269. Id.




274. Id. at 191.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 192.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 193.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 191.
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referendum procedure itself.2 8 2 While the developer relied upon evidence of
discriminatory voter sentiment, the Court ruled that statements made by private
individuals in the course of a citizen-driven petition drive, while sometimes
relevant to equal protection analysis, do not, in and of themselves, constitute state
action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, the developer failed
to show that the "private motives that triggered" the referendum drive "[could]
fairly be attributed to the state."2 8 3
The result in City of Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio is indeed a sad commentary on
efforts of citizens to exclude based upon rank racial prejudice. If housing is a
fundamental right, then a discriminatory purpose would not need to be shown,
only some form of state action. While the referendum mechanism itself seems
fairly innocuous, its use for the avowed purpose of denial and exclusion seems
hardly different from that in Hunter v. Erickson.2 8 4 Indeed, it seems that the only
real difference between the mechanism here and the one in Hunter is that the
latter involved express language in the charter making distinctions based upon
race, but City of Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio permitted express exclusion based on race
with the law's backing. It seems that there was no less state action here than in
Shelley v. Kraemer,2 85 as the ability to deny rights was only available through a
mechanism enforced by the state.
Due process claims regarding housing have been found in a variety of con-
texts-arbitrarily denying building permits to construct low-income housing,2 86
knowingly and deliberately locating and populating public housing projects on
the basis of race,287 and arbitrarily terminating the tenancies of public housing
tenants.28 8 While this principle might enable certain housing projects to proceed,
it will not serve to foster affirmative efforts to afford housing or ensure
affordability.
V. HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY UNDER STATE LAW
While not imposing an affirmative burden upon cities to construct housing
at public expense for all who need it, in recent years state courts have been
analyzing land use ordinances to ensure that land is available for affordable
housing. They have ruled that towns have an obligation to attend to the housing
282. Id. at 195.
283. Id. at 196.
284. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
285. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
286. Scott v. Greenville, 716 F.2d 1409, 1417-21 (4th Cir. 1983) (finding a due process violation
through denial of building permit to construct low-income housing).
287. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d at 73233 (7th Cir. 1971).
288. See Green, supra note 176, at 720-30.
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Imagining a Right to Housing
needs of its citizens 289 and that to deny citizens desiring to reside in a particular
community the opportunity for affordable and decent housing is a denial of
substantive due process.29 0 Perhaps the most famous case expressing these views
is Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel291 There,
a nonprofit group sought a building permit to construct fifty garden-style
apartments.2 92 The permit was denied. The organization sued, alleging discrimi-
nation and a violation of the federal and state constitutions. 293 The court reached
its conclusions under state law, finding it not necessary to consider federal
constitutional grounds.29 4 It explained that adopting land use regulations are
within a state's police power, but all police power enactments must conform to
the basic state constitutional requirements of substantive due process and equal
protection of the laws.2 95 A zoning regulation, like any police power enactment,
must promote public health, safety, morals, or general welfare-any zoning
enactment contrary to the general welfare is thus invalid.2 96 When a regulation
has a substantial external impact, the welfare of the state's citizens beyond the
municipality cannot be disregarded and must be recognized and served.2 97
Because shelter and food are the most basic human needs,29 providing adequate
housing to all categories of people is essential in promoting the general welfare
required in all land use regulations. 299 When a municipality in its land use
regulations has not made it realistically possible to create a variety and choice of
housing, a facial showing of violation of substantive due process or equal
protection has been made and the burden shifts to the municipality to establish a
valid basis for action or inaction.
289. See e.g., Fernley v. Board of Supervisors of Schuylkill, 502 A.2d 585 (Pa. 1985); Surrick v.
Zoning Hearing Bd, 382 A.2d 105 (Pa. 1977); Associated Builders v. Livermore, 18 Cal.3d 582 (Cal.
1976); Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102 (N.Y. 1975).
290. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 67 A.D.2d 506 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979); Utah Hous. Fin. Agency
v. Smart, 561 P.2d 1052 (Utah 1977); Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of
Livermore, 557 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1976); Southern Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 724
(N.J. 1975).
291. Mount Laurel Twp., 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).
292. Id. at 722.
293. Id. at 716
294. Id. at 724.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 725.
297. Id. at 726.
298. Id. at 727.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 727. On remand, the town offered to grant a permit on a tiny area, one in a flood zone and
not served by water and sewer connections. When this case made its way back up on appeal, the Supreme
Court was quite angry and exasperated with the town. It decided that stern measures were in order.
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Mt. Laurel Township, 456 A. 2d 390 (N.J. 1985). The Court set up
a three judge panel of overseers for zoning decisions, requiring zoning ordinances to be approved by the
judges, set up a builder's remedy, under which a builder that proposed to maintain a percentage of the
units as affordable would be issued a building permit. id. at 418-21. These measures did not sit well with
the communities and the state enacted comprehensive housing legislation-the Fair Housing Act, which
No. 3] 433
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While affordable housing measures are being adopted on the local and state
levels, and despite the broad thinking position of Southern Burlington, such
measures are still often met with opposition by local owners and developers.30 '
These battles and confrontations could be averted by the recognition of a "right to
housing."
VI. NEW PREDICATES FOR AN AFFIRMATIVE RIGHT
So far, I have sought to moor a right to housing in the interstices of the
Constitution, next to or within the interest in liberty. The identification of rights in
the penumbra or interstices of the Constitution has rested on the conclusion that
they were predicates toward the fulfillment or enjoyment of the express rights.
Without privacy, one is truly not free. To be free, one must be able to travel where
and when one chooses, even if this adds to a state's burden of providing welfare
benefits to the newly arrived needy. One cannot be assured a fair and meaningful
trial without the assistance of counsel to explain the proceedings and advise on
courses to take. Essentially, the court determined that these penumbral rights
were essential to enjoy, and resided within, the larger express rights. The
connection between housing and liberty is no less direct.
The rationale for finding the right to travel as a fundamental component of the
right to liberty should also provide the basis for striking down ordinances that
preclude the construction or making available of affordable housing. The
unavailability of affordable housing has no less impact on one's freedom to travel
as the ineligibility for welfare benefits in another state. The parallel is exact.
Indeed, many municipalities adopt such ordinances for the specific purpose of
excluding certain undesirable populations.30 2
Not only does housing unavailability interfere with the right to travel as a
component of liberty, it also affects liberty in the more abstract sense. This
set up the Council on Affordable Housing ("COAH"). COAH's mission was to assess the affordable
housing needs and to promulgate rules and dictate the requirements to municipalities. It was given the
authority to prescribe formulas, establish housing needs, oversee implementation, and develop a process
for addressing affordable housing. Initially, using a convoluted formula, COAH established state-wide
and local quotas for affordable housing. It devised various categories of needs (present, prospective,
unmet). It set up a program for sharing needs under "Regional Contribution Agreements," under which
communities could pay other communities to create affordable housing. COAH has adopted three rounds
of rules, the latest after a remand of the Second Round in In re N.J.A.C. 5:94 & 5:95, 390 N.J. Super. 1
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007), cert. denied, 914 A.2d 348 (N.J. 2007). The Third Round Rules are
currently under challenge. Criticism includes that COAH had designated parks, highway medians, and
cemeteries as available land for housing; imposed an affirmative obligation upon such towns to actually
construct new housing; that COAH's projection of growth was based on outdated or flawed information.
301. See e.g., United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 29 F.3d 40 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v.
Yonkers Bd. of Educ. 927 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1991); C. THEODORE KOEBEL ETAL., CTR. FOR Hous. RESEARCH
& METRO. INST., COMMUNITY ACCEPTANCE OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING (2004), available at http://
www.realtor.org/ncrer.nsf/files/koebellangfr.pdf/$FILE/koebellangfr.pdf.
302. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 29 F.3d 40; Yonkers Bd. of Educ. 927 F.2d 85; Reinhart v. Lincoln Cnty.,
482 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 2007).
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Imagining a Right to Housing
abstract sense of liberty-a private sphere for flourishing-has been embraced by
the Supreme Court and Congress in numerous ways. Griswold serves to protect
families in the intimate details of their lives as they express themselves within
their homes; 3 0 3 Roe v. Wade ensured decisions concerning whether to procreate
were reserved to the affected person; 30 Shapiro removed obstacles to traveling
freely to a better place.3 05 Housing should be considered to be among these other
liberty interests long-protected by the Court and supported by Congress.
Housing is an essential predicate for economic and social power, and the
absence of power results in marginalization. Max Weber's theories on social and
economic organization are particularly apt on this point. He explains what most
significantly drives the structure of every legal order is the distribution of power,
economic or otherwise, within the respective community. Power is understood to
mean "the chance of a person or of a number of persons to realize their own will
in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating
in the action."3 06 The achievement of "social honor" stands squarely alongside
the economic benefits in the concept of power. "Indeed, social honor .. . may be
the basis of political or economic power." 307 Power and social honor succeed in
marking one's place in the community, in part through the existence of some
guarantee by the existing legal order.3 08 While the legal order operates to enhance
one's chances to hold power or honor, it cannot always secure them. This appears
so, also in part, because the "economic order" dictates the way in which social
honor is distributed within the community.309 Thus, using Weber's logic, secure
and decent housing seems required to ensure a place in the social order with some
ability to influence the contours of the legal order.3
Nothing more substantially ties one to a community than housing. Communi-
ties are agglomerations of individuals for the achievement of shared ends:
spiritual and moral support; identity; economic interdependence; and intellectual
stimulation. It is said that the individual is bound to the community both by
mutual agreement and by the desire for shared ends.3 11 At a minimum, human
flourishing seems to contemplate the ability to achieve self-fulfillment, including
the capacity to make meaningful and autonomous choices about alternative
life structures. Achieving self-fulfillment seems to require a life without
substantial want of basic human necessities such as warmth from the cold,
physical nourishment, safety from predators, and an environment conducive to
303. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
304. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973).
305. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969).




309. Id. at 181.
310. Id.
311. Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REv. 741, 772-74 (1999).
No. 3] 435
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calm, contemplation, and intellectual exchange and/or exploration.3 12 These all
mean security and control over one's physical space.
The community is the vehicle that mediates the resources needed for human
flourishing.3 13 What makes a community? The physical space, the residents, the
common history, and common sought-after ends. Communities play a "crucial
role[ ] in the formation of our preferences, the extent of our expectations, and the
scope of our aspirations."3 14 Communities create and foster social relations,
encouraging norms that may include those of "equality, dignity, respect, and
justice as well as freedom and autonomy."3 15 They enable economic interdepen-
dence and foster environments for intellectual stimulation through exchange and
social relations.316
Ownership, or at least an abode in which one has a measure of security of
tenure, is an important determinant of choices by the community. Property
owners are consulted, but non-owners are not-their well-being is ignored.
Merely having access along with other members of a community does not fulfill
the conditions necessary for human flourishing. Instead, today most seem to
recognize the need for an individual domain, a place to call one's own-whether
that is legal title to an estate in property or a rental property,317 so long as one's
tenure is not wholly subject to the whims of another.
Because the majority of people in the nation have decent, adequate housing,
the centrality of housing to well-being, employment, schooling, childrearing, and
nutrition is often not appreciated. Housing that is overcrowded, dilapidated and
that threatens health causes tremendous stress on the residents. Housing costs that
exceed the household's means threaten economic stability, with the possibility of
foreclosure or eviction. 31 Children in unstable, unhealthy housing experience a
312. Id. at 774.
313. Gregory S. Alexander, The Social Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL
L. REV. 767 (2009).
314. Id. at 766.
315. Id. at 761-68.
316. Id.; Dagan, supra note 311, at 771-74. Despite the deep and essential connection between
housing and community and human flourishing, sadly for many, the history of housing development in
America has been a tale of exclusion. Communities that were planned and developed in the suburbs were
designed to be homogenous and bourgeois. Developers sought to keep them that way, by including
covenants in deeds, precluding sales to non-Caucasians. If a grantee violated the covenant, he stood to
suffer damages or the sale might be enjoined. Municipalities also aimed to control the introduction of
certain kinds of housing in their communities through various land use devices: large lot zoning and
single-family home zones. Over time, these devices were challenged in court. See, e.g., S. Burlington
Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975), discussed supra notes 289-301 and
accompanying text.
317. One can make the argument that land ownership more strongly encourages the desirable behavior
of investment in the property than merely the right to use the land such as comes from a lease or
easement.
318. See Shelby D. Green, Disquiet on the Home Front: Disturbing Crises in the Nation's Markets and
Institutions, 30 PACE L. REv. 7, 12 (2009). In the midst of the financial industry crisis of 2008, where
millions of homeowners defaulted on unaffordable mortgage loans, improvidently taken, millions of
families were facing foreclosure.
436 [Vol. XIX
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Imagining a Right to Housing
greater risk of health issues, and rates of infant mortality are raised for mothers in
poor surroundings.3 1 9 Inadequate and/or insecure housing leads to poor academic
achievement in school, detachment from surroundings, and social alienation.3 20
Housing is necessary for self-fulfillment and self-realization. Housing is
necessary for health and thriving. The absence of decent, adequate housing
affects well-being, employment, childrearing, and nutrition. That the interest in
housing is deeply important to society can be discerned from the attention the
government has devoted to it-through government financial support, through
the Court's striking down barriers to it, and its recognized positive effects.3 2 1
Only formal recognition of this stature is lacking.
A. International Norms and Conventions
Worldwide, we are in an era where basic rights are said to include those tools,
facilities and avenues necessary to ensure freedom from fear and want, and to
facilitate the full enjoyment of one's status as a human being. That is, the right to
self-realization 3 2 2 -is another expression of the right to freedom. These rights
are usually said to include the right to work and to shelter. Housing involves these
most basic needs and is part of the larger discussion of what it means to be
human. It can create the conditions necessary for the development of human
capacity and the fulfillment of freedom and rationality. The capacity for reason
and free moral action is fundamental for human society. In this respect, the right
to housing has become recognized as a human right.3 23
This evolution may be attributed to conventions. Conventions are shared
understandings or implicit agreements adhered to because of a general expecta-
tion that others will follow. 3 24 They arise in response to a felt need and then,
through routine practice and application, take on the force of law. They guide be-
havior and set the contours of rights and obligations.3 25 David Hume described
property rights as "conventions" 326 that arise spontaneously from "a general
sense of common interest; which sense all the members of the society express
319. Crowley, supra note 3, at 23.
320. Id.
321. See discussion of housing policies and programs infra notes 176-99 and accompanying text.
322. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982); Sandy G. Smith,
The Essential Qualities of A Home, 14 J. ENvTL. PSYCH. 31, 31 (1994) (discussing the psychological
relationship people have with their homes and finding the qualities of continuity, privacy, self-expression
and personal identity, and warmth were associated with home environments. "[The] feeling of control
within the home is salient for most people, and is linked to the satisfaction of basic psychological
needs.").
323. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III)
(Dec. 10,1948); The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (recognizing housing as a human right and a fundamental freedom).
324. THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 454 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
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The Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law & Policy
to one another, and which induces them to regulate their conduct by certain
rules . ... 327
Developing conventions may be seen in the broadening of protectable interests
and persons (such as right to work, marry, maternity leave); governmental
commitments to furthering and protecting interests (funding housing programs,
health care); as well as evolving international notions and standards. 3 2 8 Almost
universally, despite vast cultural, economic, and political differences, national
constitutions all over the world explicitly treat the government's obligations for
ensuring housing for its people.3 29 Support for housing for all in need appears on
a number of different fronts. There are market-based approaches, in which
countries provide support to its citizens as consumers of housing. This support
will take the form of mortgage subsidies, first-time buyers' grants, subsidized
sites, and other kinds of individual subsidies.33 0 Suppliers of housing stock may
also receive various kinds of subsidies under urban renewal programs. 3 3 1 The
European Union has also acted to facilitate transactions in housing through
measures regulating mortgage lending, standardization of building components,
327. Id.
328. In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), in determining the constitutionality of the death
penalty for one who committed a capital crime at age 17, the Court looked to international norms for
guidance.
329. Scorr LECKIE, UNDP HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000: HOUSING RIGHTS 5 (1999), available
at http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2000/papers/leckie.pdf. Leckie explains that if human rights
are linked to and found to be indispensable for the enjoyment of housing rights (e.g., freedom of
movement and to choose one's residence, privacy and respect for the home, equal treatment under the
law, the right to human dignity, the right to security of the person, certain formulations of the right to
property or the peaceful enjoyment of possessions), the overwhelming majority of the constitutions of
nations make reference, at least implicitly, to housing rights. Id. He cites a law in the United Kingdom,
the 1985 Housing Act, that requires local city councils to provide adequate accommodation to homeless
families and persons in priority need, and a French law of 1990 that purports to "guarantee a right to
housing [as a duty of solidarity for the nation as a whole]." Id. at 33. Any person or family finding
difficulties because of the inability of his resources to meet his needs has the right to collective assistance
under conditions fixed by law that will ensure access to decent and independent housing where he can
maintain himself." Id. (citing Law 90/449 of 31 May 1990 (visant A la mise en oeuvre du droit au
logemont ['Loi Besson'], France)). In Germany, an official submission by the government states that
"[T1n the case of homelessness, Article 1(1), in association with Articles (2)(1) and 28(1) of the Basic Law
on the principle of a social state based on the rule of law, gives rise to the homeless person's subjective
right to be allocated accommodation enabling him to lead a dignified existence. Furthermore, the said
principle obligates the state to take into account the creation of sufficient living space when shaping the
economic order and making provisions for the general good." Id. (citing Note verbale by the Permanent
Mission of Germany to the U.N. Centre for Human Rights, 23 February 1994, pp. 8-9). Leckie points out
that "an independent commentator has backed this view, asserted that German case law can be construed
to reveal a right to housing, although an independent right to housing is not established pursuant to the
German Basic Law." Id. at 33 (citing K. Bernd Ruthers (1993) "Ein Grondrecht auf Wohnung durch die
Hintertir" in Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (2.588)).
330. Padraic Kenna, Housing Rights-The New Benchmarks for Housing Policy in Europe?,
37 THE URB. LAWYER 87, 90 (2005). These forms of support compare on many levels to those available in
the United States.
331. Id. at 90-91.
438 [Vol. XIX
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Imagining a Right to Housing
332
and prohibiting discrimination on account of race or migrant status.
The larger, better-developed approach to housing is to enfold housing rights
within the larger philosophy of human rights. This strategy is long-standing
and well grounded in a number of human rights initiatives and directives. Nearly
half of these contain specific provisions on housing and if the "human right to
adequate housing" is construed broadly, such a right may be found within the
matrix of national laws dealing with housing acts; rent regulations; rights of the
homeless; landlord-tenant law; urban reform laws; civil and criminal codes; land
use regulation, planning, development, and environmental standards; housing
and building codes and standards; laws relating to inheritance rights for women;
land acquisition and expropriation acts; non-discrimination; equality rights; and
eviction laws, as well as in judicial decisions interpreting these laws, in all the
other countries.33 3
In addition, several international covenants specifically address and provide
for a right to adequate housing.3 34 Under these covenants, governments are
obliged to take whatever steps are necessary for the purposes of the full
realization of the right to adequate housing, including, but not limited to, the
adoption of necessary legislation. While no particular sum or portion of public
spending that should be devoted to housing is specified, governments must yet
devote the "maximum of its available resources" towards securing the various
rights to its people.3 36 Many of these core contents of housing rights will require
no expenditure of money and few positive interventions by governments, only a
commitment to implementing governmental policies and effective structures
for facilitating these rights. 3 Even when 'available resources' are verifiably
inadequate within countries, international law requires "governments to ensure
332. Id.
333. Id. In 1991, the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted General
Comment No. 4 on the Right to Adequate Housing. General Comment No. 4 indicates that the following
seven components form the core contents of the human right to adequate housing: "(a) legal security of
tenure; (b) availability of services, materials, facilities and infrastructure; (c) location; (d) habitability;
(e) affordability; (f) accessibility; and (g) cultural adequacy." Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights,
General Comment No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing, 8, U.N. Doc. E/1992/23 (Dec. 13, 1991). The
General Comment stipulates that the right to housing should not be interpreted in a narrow or restrictive
sense which equates it with the shelter provided by merely having a roof over one's head or views.shelter
exclusively as a commodity. Rather the norm should be seen as the right to live somewhere in security,
peace and dignity. Id. at para. 7.
334. International Covenant On Economic, Social And Cultural Rights (1966), adopted by United
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 2200A(XXI), 16 December 1966, entered into force on
3 January 1976. Article 11(1) (recognizing the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living ...
[including] housing); International Covenant On Civil And Political Rights (1966), adopted by United
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 2200A(XXI), 16 December 1966, entered into force on
3 January 1976. Articles 12 & 17 (guaranteeing everyone lawfully within the territory of a State ...
the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence).
335. Comm. on Econ. Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties'
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The Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law & Policy
the widest possible enjoyment of the relevant rights under prevailing circum-
stances, and to demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources
that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, these
minimum obligations."3 38 At the same time, it is generally understood that the
human right to adequate housing does not necessarily imply a duty on gov-
ernments to substantively provide a house to anyone who requests it-that is, the
state is not required to build housing for the entire population; provide it free of
charge to all. Nor is it required necessarily to fulfill all aspects of this right
immediately upon assuming duties to do so or exclusively assume control over
the provision of this right. Governments are also not required to fulfill the right in
precisely the same manner in all circumstances and locations. 3 Instead, the right
is conceived more broadly and is generally understood to mean:
(a) [t]hat once such obligations have been formally accepted, the State will
endeavor by all appropriate means possible to ensure everyone has access to
housing resources, adequate for health, well-being and security, consistent
with other human rights; (b) [t]hat a claim or demand can be made upon society
for the provision of or access to housing resources should a person be home-
less, inadequately housed or generally incapable of acquiring the bundle of
entitlements implicitly linked with housing rights; and (c) [t]hat the State,
directly upon assuming legal obligations, will undertake a series of measures
which indicate policy and legislative recognition of each of the constituent
aspects of the right in question.340
The government's duties take on a quadruple aspect. First, there is the duty to
respect housing rights, which essentially means respecting limits of state
action.34 1 Second is the duty to promote, which requires affirmative effort by the
state to avoid and strike down measures that may have the effect of hindering the
enjoyment of the right.34 2 These efforts may be quite varied and may range from
"comprehensive legislative review; the adoption of laws, policies, and impera-
tives toward ensuring the full realization of housing rights; the identification of
"discemable benchmarks" for measuring efforts towards full housing for all; and
the adoption of national housing strategies and time-frames for achieving
housing goals.34 3
Third is a duty to protect the right to housing, which obliges the state to
338. Id. annex III, [ 10.
339. Comm'n on Human Rights, Subcomm. on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, The Realization of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: The Right to Adequate Housing,
11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub/2/1995/12 (July 12, 1995).
340. Id. at para. 12.
341. LECIGE, supra note 329, at 19.
342. Id.
343. Such a strategy should reflect extensive genuine consultation with, and participation by,
all those affected, including the homeless, the inadequately housed and their representatives. Subsequent
steps must be taken by governments to ensure coordination between ministries, and regional
440 [Vol. XIX
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Imagining a Right to Housing
intervene "to prevent the violation of any individual's rights to housing by
any other individual or non-state actor, including from abuse by landlords,
property developers, landowners or any other third party capable of abusing
these rights,3 " as well as from forced evictions, racial or other forms of
discrimination, harassment, withdrawal of services, or other threats."34 5 The
duty to fulfill the right to adequate housing is said to require the state to act
positively, including appropriating public funds (for housing subsidies, public
housing and basic services), adopting regulatory measures to respond to market
inequities (monitoring rent levels and other housing costs), as well as offering tax
relief.346
Security of tenure has been identified as indispensable to the right to adequate
housing. It has been interpreted to mean "the right to feel safe in one's own home,
to control one's own housing environment and the right not to be arbitrarily
forcibly evicted." 34 7 This right in security of tenure "raises the baseline-or
minimum core entitlement-guaranteed to all persons who possess housing
rights based on international human rights standards. It serves to protect the
rights of dwellers and promotes individual and family investments in the
improvement of their own homes., 3 4 8
VII. CONCLUSION: CASTING HOUSING AS A "RIGHT"
In State v. Shack,34 9 the New Jersey Supreme Court pronounced that
"[p]roperty rights serve human values" and are "recognized to that end."35 0
It made that pronouncement as it was called upon to mark the outer boundaries of
a private landowner's rights over his land.35 1 In doing so, however, it also marked
the rights of non-owners to a private sphere they control and enjoy without
unwanted interference from others.35 2
and local authorities in order to reconcile related policies with the obligations arising from the Covenant.
Id.
344. Where such infringements do occur, public authorities should act to preclude further deprivations




348. Id. Comment No. 4 on the Right to Adequate Housing (E/1992/23) approved in 1991 by the
U.N, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Under this provision, security of tenure is
given particular prominence, in applying it to a variety of housing forms, including rental, cooperative,
owner-occupied and prescribes that States should take measures aimed at conferring legal security of
tenure on all persons.
349. 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971).
350. Id. at 372.
351. Id. at 372.
352. There, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a landowner had no right to exclude social
service workers who sought to render services to migrant workers hired by the landowner. Id. at 374. In
the 1970s, in New York, there was a movement aimed at establishing a state constitutional right to shelter.
In Callahan v. Carey, 831 N.YS.2d 352 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006), a state supreme court ruled that the
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In the current Supreme Court membership, there does not seem to be a
straight-line view for determining individual rights. On the one hand, in Kelo v.
City of New London,35 3 the Court gave great deference to local governments in
determining what is a public use for purposes of eminent domain (including a
desire for economic development), thereby compromising individual property
rights. On the other, in Heller,354 the Court upheld an individual's right to possess
firearms against government prohibition despite great societal interest in curbing
gun violence. In Kelo, individual interests in preserving long-held rights in
particular property were determined to be subordinate to the governmental
interest in stimulating the economy.3 5 5 But in Heller, individual interests in
bearing arms in their homes trumped the societal interests in curbing gun
violence. The respective interests were equally. compelling. Can the disparate
results be explained by the connection between the interest at issue and the
benefit from the award of protection-that if the government could show a close
connection between its taking and the expected benefits that would justify the
result? In Heller where the impact of the stringent limits on gun possession could
not be demonstrated, then the intrusion was too great. But what might distinguish
both these cases is the starting point of the analysis. In Kelo, the landowner's
constitutional right to property was not in debate,356 whereas in Heller, it was
necessary for the Court to find such a right, but it was clearly not from the literal
text of the Second Amendment. 5 Even if we were able to convince the Court to
read the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as liberally as it read the Second, and
to find or infer some unstated right to housing, such a right would impose an
affirmative duty on the state, unlike in the right to possess a weapon, where the
duty is negative. Under the present conception, housing rights are protected as
negative rights, which guard against undue interference with possession or the
opportunity to obtain housing, but do not operate to facilitate possession through
providing the means and availability of affordable housing. Equal protection
theory might require a heightened level of scrutiny over governmental measures
that are calculated to have a different impact on those who need housing.
The lower federal courts have taken from Lindsey the conclusion that there is
no right to have the government provide a decent, safe and affordable place to
live. 5 But, as I have asserted throughout this Article, the provision of housing
homeless held a constitutional right to nocturnal shelter, but that ruling was overturned in McCain v.
Guiliani, 252 A.D.2d 461 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). See generally Elisabetta Grande, Against the Poor:
Homelessness in U.S. Law, GLOBAL JURIST (2011), available at http://www.degruyter.com/viewlj/
gj.2011.11.1/gj.2011.11.1.1375/gj.2011.11.1.1375.xml?rskey=aUSS42&result=5&q=Elisabetta Grande.
353. 546 U.S. 469, 485-86, 490.
354. 554 U.S. 570, 648.
355. Kelo, 546 U.S. at 485-86.
356. Id. at 477.
357. Heller, 554 U.S. at 632, 636.
358. See e.g., Jaimes v. Toledo, 758 F.2d 1086, 1102 (6th Cir. 1985). There, plaintiffs who were poor
black residents of Lucas County, Ohio, sued alleging violations of various civil rights acts, the Fair
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Imagining a Right to Housing
would not be the sole consequence of a right to housing. Instead, a new
conception of a "right to housing" would require efforts by the state to strike
down arbitrary and discriminatory barriers to housing; would give rise to a
presumption of validity for governmental measures undertaken to provide
housing; and would subject to a heavier burden of justification measures that are
ostensibly neutral but operate to deny housing. To be sure, it might also require
the state to undertake measures to ensure adequate, affordable, decent, and secure
housing to all in need. In this last conception, there would inevitably be some
thorny issues that would need resolution. Would the needy have standing to sue to
force the government to provide housing? Who is eligible for such housing; what
quality of housing is required; can the right ever be terminated? However, these
issues would not be insurmountable as courts frequently make such line-drawing
decisions to protect and define the other express and penumbral rights.359 What
is important is that we bear in mind that every society is necessarily an amalgam
of its constituent economic components, and that every society has a duty to
intervene in those areas that will be socially protective and collectively useful. 36 0
We must go beyond merely imagining such a society.
Housing Act, and the National Housing Act, due to the local housing authority's failure to construct or
otherwise make housing available to them in areas of the county that were not "black-impacted." The
court explained that the Constitution does not require that defendants (or others) provide any particular
quality housing, nor even "adequate housing," for plaintiffs or the class whom they purport to represent;
Title V11I sets out "a policy ... to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing .... ."
42 U.S.C. § 3601; that language has consistently been interpreted as meaning a policy to bar
discriminatory practices in housing, and should be read together with 42 U.S.C. § 1982. Id. at 1101-02
(citing inter alia Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 388 (1969)). The court went on to rule that "Plaintiffs
have no constitutional right to be furnished "safe sanitary and decent housing" by defendants; they are
constitutionally and by statute entitled to be free of any impediment or conduct on the part of defendants
for discriminatory reasons to deny them 'fair' housing otherwise reasonably available to those in the
same position." Id. at 1102.
359. For example, how much must states expend on education for disabled students? See e.g.,
Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter by & Through Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15-16 (1993) ("There is no
doubt that Congress has imposed a significant financial burden on States and school districts [to provide a
free public education to disabled students]", yet "total reimbursement [to a parent who places her child in
a private school] would not be appropriate if the . . . cost of the private education was unreasonable").
Must states provide welfare benefits to all newcomers to the state? See, e.g., Saenz v. Cal. Dep't Soc.
Svcs., 526 U.S. 489, 506 (1999) (rejecting the state's two-tiered approach for doling out welfare benefits,
notwithstanding the state's legitimate interest in saving money). How much physical space is a prisoner
entitled to? See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1947 (2011) (ordering radical prison population
reduction, that might require construction of new prison facilities, early release of prisoners or transfer to
county facilities, as necessary to remedy for violation of prisoners' constitutional rights).
360. The current health care debate notwithstanding.
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